The geopolitical challenge of Iraqi-Kurdistan’s natural gas by Ismael, Hemin M. & NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
ISMAEL, HEMIN M., Ph.D. The Geopolitical Challenge of Iraqi-Kurdistan’s Natural 
Gas. (2018) 
Directed by Dr. Corey Johnson 160 pp. 
Kurdistan is a semi-autonomous region of Iraq with proven reserves of 200 
trillion cubic feet (5.7 trillion cubic meters) of natural gas and 45 million barrels of oil. 
While oil is currently being exported to world markets from Iraqi Kurdistan, providing 
the region with an important source of revenue, natural gas will likely be a key source of 
Kurdistan’s revenues in the future. It remains an open question whether that wealth will 
be used to promote social and economic development and good governance or whether it 
will become a curse that affects the region’s well-being. This research examines the 
internal and external dimensions of Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) natural 
resource geography. Internally, KRG has policies in place to develop its natural 
resources; therefore, this study analyzes the Kurdistan energy policy on natural gas, and 
the obstacles the KRG faces such as the deal and sharing of petroleum revenue which has 
caused issues between Kurdistan and Baghdad governments. Externally, the research 
examines energy relations between Kurdistan and powerful neighbors such as Turkey and 
Iran and also with actors in Europe that are keen to bring Kurdish gas supplies to market. 
Geopolitically, this research tests how Kurdistan’s location and contingent sovereignty 
affects its ability to develop its resource base. 
The dissertation employs a case study method. The analysis is based primarily on 
interviews with key actors in Kurdistan, including politicians from different political 
parties, members of Kurdistan’s parliament, Natural Resource Commission members, and 
representatives of international energy companies active in Kurdistan. The project also 
includes analysis of official statements of the political opposition’s parties, publically 
available data, and news reports. 
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CHAPTER I 
OVERVIEW 
  
 
1.1 Introduction 
The aim of this study is to assess the geopolitics of natural resources in Kurdistan 
Region with a focus on natural gas transportation to the international market. The 
potential for exporting natural gas and oil to Europe via Turkey may lead Kurdistan to 
gain economic power and could play a role in whether Kurdistan is eventually recognized 
as a sovereign, independent state. There are many reasons why consumers around the 
world are paying attention to Kurdistan’s gas. Ongoing events in Turkey and Ukraine are 
increasing concerns regarding the stable supply of gas to Europe. Russia’s gas exports to 
Europe rose to a record 194 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2017 (Millard 2018). Western 
European countries currently account for approximately 81% of the Gazprom’s exports 
from Russia, while Central European states took 19% of the company’s exports 
(Gazprom 2018). However, the gas demand of 28 EU member states totaled 488.9 bcm in 
2017, which was a 5.9% increase from 2016 (Henderson and Sharples 2018). 
For those European countries that need more gas and gas-derived products, 
Kurdistan is a potential supply option for Europe in the long term (Chyong, Slavkova, 
and Tcherneva 2015). According to the Ministry of Natural Resources, the KRG has 45 
billion barrels of oil and 5.7 trillion cubic meter (tcm) of gas (Ministry of Natural 
Resources 2013). In addition, the geographic distance between Kurdistan and southern
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European countries is much shorter than, for example, from West Siberian fields in 
Russia, which currently supply much of Europe’s imports, or Azerbaijan’s Caspian fields.
Distance will be one of the distinguishing factors in favor of Kurdistan exporting its 
natural gas to high-demand markets. Politically, there is also a great desire in European 
countries to find alternatives to Russian gas. This may explain why Tony Hayward, the 
former CEO of BP, described Kurdistan as “one of the last great oil and gas frontiers” in 
2011 (Thomas 2017). This dissertation provides detailed information about the existing 
natural gas and its related policy in Kurdistan.  
Kurdistan is potentially important because it may participate in pipeline projects 
(such as TANAP) that could carry out gas to Turkey and Europe. This dissertation 
proposes a positive outlook for the Kurdistan -Turkey-Europe natural gas pipeline, 
focusing on Kurdistan’s role in the natural gas trade for energy security of Europe. This 
relationship could help KRG to develop natural gas policy, secure domestic and foreign 
markets for its gas. 
It is not market dynamics alone that shape the prospects for Kurdistan’s natural 
gas. Geopolitics, in particular Kurdistan’s energy relationships with regional powers such 
as Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, as well as with Europe, are important considerations impacting 
the KRG gas sector that this dissertation examines. Finally, unlike other major energy 
producers in the region, Kurdistan is landlocked, a geographical fact that greatly impacts 
the possibilities for exporting its resources. 
This study seeks to answer four questions: 
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1. How does the Kurdistan region government’s natural gas policy function 
and what are the advantages and disadvantages of current policies 
geopolitically and economically? 
2. What role does geography play in shaping resource governance (for 
instance, taking into consideration the fact that the Kurdistan Region is 
landlocked)? 
3. What is the potential role of Kurdistan’s natural gas supplies in the energy 
supply diversification of Turkey and Europe? 
4. What role does Baghdad’s and Kurdistan’s history of natural resource 
revenue sharing play in the potential for Kurdistan to develop its natural 
resource exports? 
The scope of this research includes the importance of the Kurdistan Region’s vast 
natural resource supply and the potential for selling it to Europe and its neighbors. 
Questions about Russia’s dependability as a supplier of energy to Europe raise the 
likelihood of European countries further seeking to develop ties to Middle Eastern 
suppliers, including Caspian littoral states Azerbaijan and Iran, as well as Kurdistan. 
Evidence for heightened interest in KRG gas includes the arrival of mid-size and major 
energy companies that have invested in the Kurdistan Region. They include MOL 
Company, Genel Energy, Exxon Mobil, Chevron, Rosneft, Gazprom, and DNO a large 
Norwegian energy company, has already signed a contract to develop Tawke oil field in 
Kurdistan. Many ongoing projects support the view that European countries have turned 
towards Kurdistan and the Caspian countries in light of ongoing political tensions 
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between Turkey, Ukraine and Russia. The Anatolian pipeline, Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan 
(BTC) pipeline, the new oil pipeline between Kurdistan and Turkey, and a gas pipeline 
now under construction linking Erbil and Turkey provide examples of investors’ desire to 
diversify supplies and export routes. At the same time it must be acknowledged that a 
lack of transparency around Kurdistan’s oil and gas export strategy and revenue 
expenditures is an ongoing challenge that this dissertation examines.  
The significance of this dissertation is that it evaluates and demonstrates the 
importance of natural gas exports to Kurdistan’s foreign policy. In light of the regional 
government’s intent to diversify its natural gas export markets, understanding the 
geopolitical dynamics that influence this stated intent. Kurdistan may want to find new 
partnerships in, for example, Europe to solidify export possibilities in the long term, but 
the potential limitations presented by geopolitical realities in the broader region 
surrounding KRG must be thoroughly understood. However, mutual interest in the 
natural gas trade between Kurdistan and the European Union may also give Erbil 
leverage and be a tool to shape regional geopolitical dynamics, especially with the transit 
option of Iraq and Iran and, in the future, the Arab Gulf’s natural gas. Internal dynamics 
are also important considerations. The numerous possible obstacles to developing exports 
include revenue sharing arrangements with the Iraqi central government, the region’s 
challenging physical geography and relative location, and the ambiguous sovereignty of 
Kurdistan. As recent years have shown, there are also significant regional security 
concerns.  
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The rest of the dissertation follows as follows: Chapter 2 will review literature 
pertinent to the topic area. It will also outline the methods used in the study. Chapter 3 
surveys natural gas policy of Kurdistan with an emphasis on the internal politics affect 
the gas sector and policy. Chapter 4 surveys the geopolitical dynamics of Kurdistan's gas 
policy with a special attention paid to external energy relationships with Turkey, Iran, 
Russia, and the European Union. Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the status of Kurdistan's 
natural gas policy and the influence that both internal and external factors have on its 
development. It concludes with limitations of the study and policy recommendations for 
Kurdistan moving forward. 
1.2 The Kurdistan Region 
The Kurdistan region is an autonomous area located in Northeast Iraq that has 
been governed by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) since 1992. The KRG 
governs the three governorates of Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Duhok (Figure 1). The KRG 
also governs parts of the constitutionally disputed territories of Kirkuk and the Mosul 
Province. Kurdistan Region is one of the federal regions of Iraq that were recognized in 
the Iraqi Federal Constitution of 2005. Peshmerga, the military force of KRG, took 
control of most of the disputed territories, including areas containing oil-rich fields in the 
city of Kirkuk in 2014 (Solomon, 2014 and Guardian, 2014), and this has been a point of 
contention between the KRG and the Iraqi government.  
Kurdistan has a semi-independent government, maintains its own armed forces, 
has its own flag, and has its own official language. The population of Kurdistan is more 
than 5.2 million (United Nations Development Programme 2014). Kurds and non-Kurds 
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as well as Muslims and non-Muslims live in the region. Ethnic minorities in the region 
include Turks, Chaldeans, Syriacs, Assyrians, Yazidis, Kakayi, and Shabaks. Kurds have 
been largely self-governing for the past 25 years. Despite Kurdistan not having de jure 
sovereignty, it nevertheless operates in many respects as a free state. After attacks in 
2014 by the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS) on Kurdish territories, the Peshmerga seized the 
Kirkuk, the center of Kurdistan’s oil industry, which is a city with a Kurdish majority 
population but that is not part of the three official governorates. Also, the Peshmerga 
liberated some districts and sub-districts in Mosul from ISIS and took them under its 
control. More recently, there has been a loss of Kurdish control over the oil-rich areas in 
and around Kirkuk and Mosul. On October 16, 2017, Iraqi federal troops advanced upon 
the areas and captured parts of Kirkuk, including its CBD and southern area. The 
captured areas also included two major oil fields, Avana and Bai Hassan in the west of 
the city. Federal troops also took districts surrounding Mosul such as Mosul Dam and 
Basheqa.  
Kurdistan has long border with Turkey, Syria, and Iran. Kurdistan’s border with 
Syrian runs for a total length of 300 km; with Turkey for 600 km; and with Iran for a total 
of 1300 km.   
There are provisions in the constitution that indicate the right of the Kurds to 
exercise their authority in their areas and have the full right to act, including the disposal 
of the wealth of oil and exploitation for the benefit of the people as indicated in Article 
111, 112, and 113 (Anderson 2017). 
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A dramatic change in Kurdistan’s natural resource dynamics happened in 2015, 
when the KRG began direct oils sale to the global market. This happened in two phases. 
First, the KRG begin coordinating direct oil sales in the global market. Second, the five 
permanent members of the UNSC established diplomatic ties by opening consulates in 
Kurdistan. This marked an important step toward increased sovereignty. KRG has well-
established diplomatic ties; all five permanent members of the UN Security Council have 
consulates in Iraqi Kurdistan as well as significant economic interests in the region, 
though all still ultimately recognize KRG as a constituent part of Iraq.  
Since the KRG’s formation in 1992, oil and gas has been a major factor in 
Kurdistan economic, political affairs. Presently, KRG relies heavily on oil and natural gas 
revenues to run its government, as the region lacks any other significant income-
generating sector. Oil and gas has aided Kurdistan in regional development on many 
fronts. For example, hydrocarbon revenues aided in constructing large, modern 
universities along with shopping mall. Oil and gas revenues raised living standards but at 
the same time entrenched the power and wealth of Kurdistan in a few hands. The KRG is 
presently in economic and political crisis because it is entirely at the mercy of global 
market forces. Conditions have improved since 2014, when there was an influx some 1.6 
million refugees and IDPs displaced by the ISIS conflict into Kurdistan. The financial 
burden of caring for refugees was compounded by low oil prices, the Iraqi Federal 
government’s decision to end budgetary subsidies to KRG, and the assault of ISIS. Also, 
Kurdistan’s position as a semi-sovereign entity has contributed to its financial challenges, 
because it is unable to access credit from global financial institutions such as the 
8 
 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), which recognize Baghdad as the rightful recipient of 
credit. 
 On 25 September 2017, KRG held a referendum on the question of 
independence. Kurdish officials argued that an independent Kurdistan could become a 
new state and that would constitute a force of stability in the region and a showcase for 
democratic governance (Reuters 2017). KRG officials claimed that Kurds and non-Kurds, 
Muslims and non-Muslims, and men and women would be treated with equal respect 
under the law in an independent Kurdistan so that all could prosper (Arango 2017). But 
the situation in the disputed areas has changed when the Kurds lost control of the 
disputed areas when on 16 October 2017, the Iraqi army and Popular Mobilization Forces 
regained the disputed areas. This reduced the area of Kurdistan region by nearly half, and 
of particular consequence to Kurdistan, the most important oil fields in Kirkuk, such as 
Havana and Bai Hassan, were lost (Chughtai 2017). 
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Figure 1. Map of Kurdistan Region, Iraq. Source: Author. 
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1.3 Kurds 
There are more than 30 million Kurds living in Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and in the 
former Soviet republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan (BBC News 2017). Their homeland is 
found in the mountainous region lying between the Caspian and the Euphrates and Tigris 
river lowlands. The Kurds speak Kurdish, a language belonging to the Indo-European 
ethno-linguistic group. The Kurds are one of the largest ethno-linguistic groups without a 
state (Partlow 2008). The World War 1-era Sykes-Picot Agreement is generally 
responsible for the Kurds not having a state. This agreement between Britain and France 
essentially carved up the Ottoman Empire and placed most of the Middle East under 
British and French administration (Schuster 2004) 
As a result, the Kurds were divided by artificially drawn borders devised by 
Western powers that spread the Kurds across Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Armenia, and 
Azerbaijan. Iraq has a Kurdish population of about five million, while the Turkish Kurds 
number about three times that, and a further roughly eight million live in Iran and Syria 
(Bazilian et al. 2017). The Kurds’ cultural marginalization by the great powers began in 
1920 with the Treaty of Sèvres signed by the Ottoman government after their defeat in 
World War I. The victorious powers partitioned the Ottoman Empire, and among terms 
of the document were clauses that supported the independence of the Kurds. Three years 
later when Mustafa Kemal Ataturk came to power in Turkey, he offered a new deal with 
the victorious powers to change the Treaty of Sevres to the Treaty of Lausanne, which 
ended the Kurd’s long held vision for independence. Powerful states in the world are 
partially responsible for the fact that Kurds never achieved full sovereignty. One recent 
11 
 
example includes the United States of America’s role in putting down the Kurdish 
revolution in 1975, when Henry Kissinger, the Secretary of State of U.S. under President 
Gerald Ford, helped draft an agreement between Iraq and Iran known as the Algerian 
Agreement. This agreement stopped Iran from helping the Kurds against Saddam 
Hussein’s regime thereby crushing the revolution and the Kurds’ best chance at 
separation from Baghdad. Many Kurds maintain ill-feelings toward Kissinger. Masuad 
Barzani, the former Kurdistan president, said the following about Kissinger: 
 
Kissinger bears the main responsibility for the disaster which befell the Kurdish 
people after 1975. For me, he is enemy number one. I will never forget what the 
Kurds had to pay as a result of his stances, maneuvers, and the deals he made 
without taking into consideration the suffering these caused (Askary 2004, 64).
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this literature review is to examine the contributions to the 
literature by geographers, economists, and other academics in the field of the geopolitics 
of energy in general and natural gas in particular. I will review three pertinent bodies of 
literature that inform this study and its focus. It is important to realize that because of the 
general lack of Kurdistan-specific literature on natural gas, I also include literature on oil, 
which has been exported now for some time. The first section will discuss the energy 
policy (natural gas) of Kurdistan region government. In the second section, competition 
over natural resources (natural gas) between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) 
and Baghdad will be discussed. The last section addresses the political, geographic, 
cultural, and economic and stability challenges associated with distribution of natural 
resources with a specific focus on governance and sovereignty policy in conflict-ridden 
place. 
2.2 Resource Competition between KRG and Baghdad 
The main issues of KRG’S gas policy are tensions with Baghdad over sharing 
revenue and capacity and the gas extraction rights in borderlands between Kurdish and 
Arab areas. Al-Khatteeb (2013) examined gas policy in Iraq and KRG by considering 
political relationships, stating “Currently, Kurdistan’s strategy to develop its oil and gas
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separately from the central government of Baghdad is to disagree upon an incorporated 
federal hydrocarbon law” (Al-Khatteeb 2013). Heintel discusses the negotiations between
KRG and Baghdad on oil and gas law as one way to solve the problem between two 
governments, but concludes that negotiations on a unified federal hydrocarbon law did 
not resolve these issues (Heintel 2016). For example, both KRG and the Iraqi government 
signed contracts with international oil and gas companies independent of one another, 
launched licensing processes through negotiations, and concluded dozens of long-term 
agreements based on different fiscal regimes and legal frameworks. They justified these 
actions by citing their different interpretations of the constitution and regulations. KRG 
approved its regional hydrocarbon law in August 2007, even though it was not accepted 
by Baghdad. The federal government “banned” all oil and gas companies working in the 
Kurdistan Region for not having sought prior consent from Baghdad. Hence, many 
scholars identify these as the sources of the problems between Baghdad and Erbil on 
many issues such as gas and oil revenue-sharing, and use them as method way to predict 
future of energy relations between Bagdad and region (Natali 2013; Voller 2013; Mills 
2016). 
2.3 Ethnic Tensions, Resources, and Sovereignty 
 Voller (2013) predicts the presence of Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen in the region 
may lead to further challenges for negotiations. Those areas rich with gas and oil as 
identified in article 140 of the Iraqi constitution are problematic in that there are existing 
disputes over which group—Kurds, Arabs, or Turkmen—can legitimately claim 
sovereignty over the areas. The Kurdish government has attempted to leverage support of 
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the U.S. over Kurdish claims to sovereignty by signing numerous oil & gas contracts with 
large multinational oil companies such as ExxonMobil. 
The KRG implemented its hydrocarbon policy in 2007, and shortly thereafter it 
signed many gas and oil contracts with Turkey to export its oil and gas independently 
from Baghdad. The situation grew risky between the two authorities (Voller 2013).There 
were many efforts to resolve the problem by signing new agreements between Baghdad 
and Erbil, but the situation is complicated by the unresolved questions around Kurdish 
sovereignty and legitimacy in its relationship to the Iraqi government. Voller (2013) 
emphasizes that tensions over revenue-sharing could lead to war between Kurds and 
Arabs (Voller 2013). The entry of the Kurdish Peshmerga into many of these areas ahead 
of or alongside U.S. troops in 2003 made the tensions between Kurds and local Arab, 
Turkmen, and other ethnic groups in Kirkuk, the surrounding countryside, and other 
disputed territories of mixed demographic makeup even stronger. 
2.4 Kurdistan Region Government Natural Gas Policy 
 Internally, one of the biggest domestic problems is the dispute between two 
parties ruling Kurdistan PUK and PDK. Some scholars used the contentious relationship 
between two big political parties ruling Kurdistan and Shiite parties such as the Islamic 
Dawa Party as one way to understand the situation between Kurds and Arabs on oil- and 
gas-rich fields in disputed territories (Michael 2012; Mills 2016). In addition, Voller 
argued that the regional interference by Iran, Russia and Turkey is one of the causes of 
the escalation of tensions between two political parties which have been ruling Kurdistan 
on sharing revenue from border customs and oil export. Also since each of the two main 
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party have their own Peshmerga. In this structure there is no united fighting force and this 
makes it easier for powerful neighboring states to interfere in Kurdistan’s internal affairs 
(Voller 2013). In Kurdistan, as in many Middle East and sub-Saharan countries, political 
power tends to be concentrated among a few and less democratically distributed. This 
gives concentrated authority much power over economic sectors including influence on 
the energy sector. Layachi’s (2013) discussion of the geopolitics of Algerian natural gas 
demonstrates the problems of such a system. He discussed the detrimental impacts on 
Algeria’s natural gas industry when President Bouteflika became ill. While ill the energy 
sector was vulnerable to manipulation of those surrounding the president, which were 
unelected officials. Layachi (2013) surveyed the whole geopolitical situation and 
considered four scenarios for the future of Algerian natural gas and the obstacles facing 
the gas sector. Layachi (2013) notes many factors like maturing wells of natural gas, and 
future competitors with Algerian gas as threats to collapse. The KRG political system is a 
mixed Presidential and Parliamentary system in which the President has more power than 
Parliament and sometimes unilaterally decides how to handle oil and gas. The Kurdistan 
President has a good relationship with Turkey and that why most Kurdish contracts are 
signed with Turkey and not Iran and Iraq.  
Kurdistan’s present politics is similar to what Ostrowski described as 
“corporatism.” Corporatism is a system in which party interests at the elite level strongly 
influence the objectives charted and the decisions made for a government (Nicholson 
2012). The two big parties in Kurdistan have much authority and control most vital 
sectors. 
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One of the external problems for the development of Kurdistan’s energy strategy 
come from neighboring countries. Turkey, for example, is concerned by the KRG 
exercising power over the Kurdish – Iraqi disputed areas based on the assumption that 
more KRG territorial control could translate into more power and be a precursor of a 
sovereign Kurdish state with destabizing ramifications for Kurds living in Turkey.  
Voller (2013) analyzed if Kurdish control in more territories could move them 
towards independence. Voller stated Turkey supports the Turkmen population of Kirkuk 
in order to hamper Kurdish claims to the region (Voller 2013). Kurdistan’s significant 
reserves of hydrocarbons are a tool for pursuing full sovereignty and a means of leverage 
in dealing with its neighbors in Middle East. Following the incursions of transnational 
terrorist groups like ISIS in June 2014, the regional security situation changed. Some 
scholars suggested that in the future, Kurdish gas pipeline infrastructure could go through 
Rojava/ Kurdistan in Syria directly to the Mediterranean (Rashed 2014). Given its 
secular, democratic, and progressive nature, Rojava is a reliable and stable entity. Kurds 
can guarantee the security of the pipeline, which is likely a key issue to be addressed 
before investment in such a pipeline. The idea of transporting Kurdish gas and oil directly 
to the Mediterranean from Iraq to Syrian Kurdistan could easily become reality were, if 
Cohen (2006) suggests, Syria partitioned into separate states, though the prospects of this 
happening are quite unclear. All of this points to one major disadvantage Kurdistan faces 
due to its geographical location; because it is landlocked, it must build pipelines to its 
markets through transit states. 
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Moreover, the Kurdistan Regional Government’s energy strategies have many 
characteristics that make its energy sector particularly attractive to countries that need to 
import oil and gas (for instance, Turkey, Germany, Italy, Greece, and Hungary) (Elliott 
and Beryl 2012). Ongoing events in Turkey are increasing concerns regarding the stable 
supply of gas to Turkey and Europe. Russia is currently supplying 30 bcm of the 50 bcm 
of natural gas that Turkey needs every year (Austivk and Rzayeva 2017a). But Europe's 
annual demand for additional gas imports may reach 80 billion cubic meters by 2020 and 
surpass 140 billion cubic meters by 2030 (Agence France Presse 2014). Hence, European 
countries need more gas and other gas resources. According to data estimates by industry 
experts, the KRG has 45 billion barrels of oil and 99 trillion to 201 trillion cubic feet of 
gas. Moreover, geographically Kurdistan is close to the southern European countries. 
Therefore, the European countries that are searching for other alternatives may reduce 
their dependence on Russia gas by seeking alternatives in a place such as Kurdistan. 
Tony Hayward, the former CEO of BP, described Kurdistan in 2011 as “one of the last 
great oil and gas frontiers” (Thomas 2017) Currently, it is Turkey that holds the key to 
open the door to more exports of Kurdish oil and gas. Paasche and Mansurbeg (2014)  
say as much in their analysis, suggesting that the KRG as a highly dependent on Turkey 
for export pathways to get oil and gas to market. Their analysis focuses on the KRG's fast 
developing energy relationship with Turkey, its implications for Turkey's energy security, 
and, ultimately, regional security in general (Paasche and Mansurbeg 2014). In addition 
to regional security concerns and access to transit states’ pipeline networks, hydrocarbon 
prices in international trading markets and progress by KRG in making necessary reforms 
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influence the future of the energy sector (Mills 2016). Elliott and Beryl (2012) looked at 
Kurdistan’s gas projects and discussed the challenges and opportunities. To understand 
the role of Kurdistan’s gas in term of politics and economics, the authors employed two 
marketing scenarios. The first focused on Kurdish gas being used for domestic electricity 
generation. In this scenario they found that several hundred millions dollars in spending 
on infrastructure would lead to profit from contractors. The second looked at an export 
strategy to Turkish markets. This scenario suggested that returns are likely to be impacted 
by the volume of gas and its prices, and this would require ensuring long term contract 
beforehand (Elliott and Beryl 2012). 
As Zulal (2012) argues, foreign policy is an important tool for Kurdistan as it 
seeks to develop its natural gas strategy. This involves attention to details about the 
relationship between foreign policy and private investment because the two are not 
always separate. As an example of the relationship between foreign policy and energy, 
Zulal (2012) noted that large international oil and gas companies had invested around US 
$4 billion in Kurdistan.  
Most of the classical literature on geopolitics of landlocked states focused on the 
influence of location vis-à-vis the sea on economic power (Spykman 1938). Moreover, 
there are few major published studies on the influence of landlocked location on 
undermining sovereignty and authority. There are also few major publication on the 
energy policy of Kurdistan. Some of the research focused on foreign policy but not on 
energy policy.  
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Kurdistan’s neighbors have not supported an independent Kurdish state in region. 
Therefore, skillful diplomacy and positive relations are vital for the existence of the state 
(Zulal 2012). A current example of diplomacy is the 2013 Kurdish – Turkish energy 
agreement, which has many concessions for Turkey, including cheap supplies of gas. 
Zulal (2012) notes the Kurdistan’s landlocked geography as a factor in its economic 
development, but only one of many economic factors. The author explained the history of 
the Kurdish Region with neighbors such as Iran and Turkey. Some researchers focus on 
energy as a means of building relationships with neighbors without explaining how this 
would best be accomplished. Gunter stated: “The two big players (PUK and PDK 
political parties) in Kurdistan have made trouble in the region over the past 21 years but 
oil and gas have reduced the tension among them. The Kurdistan Regional government 
(KRG) is a merely landlocked, rump territory surrounded by powerful Neighbors” 
(Gunter 2008, 238). While it is true that the KRG currently has no real alternate export 
paths other than Turkey, I argue that the energy relationship between the two sides is 
more complex than imagined. Moreover, Turkey’s government has expressed its desire to 
become an important energy hub between Asia and Europe. Paasche and Mansurbeg 
(2014) used the complexities of regional circumstance to advise the KRG government 
about how it could take advantage of the many ongoing conflicts between various 
regional actors in order to benefit the prospects of oil and gas exports to Europe through 
the Turkish port of Ceyhan in the aftermath of the 2014 crisis between Russia and 
Ukraine and Russia and Turkey. The authors analyze the energy relationship between 
Turkey and Kurdistan based on factors such as the relationship between Turkish energy 
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companies, such as Genel Energy, working in eight oil fields, and the Kurdistan 
government. Also, the instability of the area in the south and the center of Iraq favors the 
moving forward of the energy relationship between Turkey and KRG. There is a 
significant relationship between the Kurdish and Turkish governments because the latter 
considers Kurdistan a safe haven for the investment of money in sectors such as oil, gas, 
and construction. Turkish companies have conducted research on those areas of interest 
in the quest to make large sums of money. Also, some statistics show the importance of 
the value of relations between the KRG and Turkey, such as the volume of trade between 
Kurdistan and Turkey surpassing $12 billion in 2013 (“Turkey-Iraq Border Trade Hits 
Record Low” 2016). Furthermore, Dahlman (2002) explained that Turkey benefits to a 
greater extent than countries such as Azerbaijan, Iraq, Iran, and Turkmenistan seeking to 
export gas via Turkey. In addition, Qurbani (2016) analyzes the Iranian influence on 
KRG energy policy by discussing the Iran’s good relations with PUK party. At the same 
time, it must be noted that a goal of Iran’s foreign policy is to marginalize Kurdistan’s 
economic development, especially in oil and gas sector, because of potential competition. 
Iran sees the foreign energy companies’ involvement in Kurdistan as threatening 
threat to the extent that it could help Kurdistan further develop its gas and oil production 
while Iran’s own sectoral development is inhibited by Western sanctions. However, an 
even more important threat to Kurdish resource development is countries such as Turkey 
taking advantage of Kurdistan’s disadvantageous geographic position by signing  
lucrative long-term (50-year) deals to export Kurdish gas to the north at low prices 
(Reuters 2013). According to Tony Hayward, the former chairman of Genel Energy, one 
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of the leading energy companies in Iraqi Kurdistan said along with the benefit of 
closeness, which will bring costs down, KRG gas will contribute 1 or 2 percent to gross 
domestic product (GDP). He also made a price prediction, saying the price will be half of 
the cheapest price Turkey has ever paid for gas (Gungor 2015). However, Turkish actors 
also are well aware that Kurdish gas and oil policy favors the development of an 
independent economy, which may lead to the creation of a state in northern Iraq. Turkey 
fears that outcome, but the economic considerations have caused it not to emphasize the 
political side of the issue (Arango and Yeginsu 2015). According to Sepil, the chairman 
of the board of Genel Company, turning to Kurdistan’s oil and gas reserves will secure 30 
billion cubic meters of gas per year for Turkey and help it cut costs (Can 2012). Can 
(2012) observes that Kurdistan has offered more favorable prices than Iran and 
Azerbaijan, from which Turkey has already bought gas (Can 2012). KRG plans to export 
10 bcm of natural gas to Turkey over the next two years as KRG Natural Resource 
Minister, Hawrami, stated at the 2015 Atlantic Council Summit in Istanbul (Ustun and 
Dudden 2017). But the European market is a priority market for Kurdistan for a number 
of reasons—primarily geopolitical and geographical proximity. All economic 
expectations indicate that Kurdistan could export its gas to the Turkey by 2020.  
2.5 Methodological Approach 
This dissertation employs a case study method to resolve the research questions 
posed above. The case study approach enables the researcher to maintain a whole view of 
the unit of analysis and its context (Yin 2003). The case study is the energy policy of 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). In this case, the primary data comes from 
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official documents and interviews with key informants from government, the energy 
industry, local and foreign subject matter experts, and civil society organizations. The 
analysis also tracks the developmental stages of Kurdistan’s natural gas policy through 
publicly available government and broadcasting sources. The strength of the case study 
method is that it allows for the use of multiple sources of empirical evidence (Yin 2003). 
The case study design is preferred for “when”, “how” and “why” questions (Yin 2003). 
The case study design is also preferred when the researcher has limited or no control over 
events, and, “when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon” (Yin 2003). According 
to Yin (2003) case studies are needed when researcher want to understand social 
phenomena that are often complicated. Therefore, the case study is a useful way to 
investigate a phenomenon within its background, although the boundary between the 
phenomenon and its context could not always be clearly explained. Moreover, unlike 
survey studies, the case study method does not limit the number of variables of interest to 
the investigation.  
The case study generalizes to a theoretical proposition rather than to a population. 
Therefore, the goal of the case study is to “expand and generalize theories analytic 
generalization (Yin 2003). The descriptive analysis of the energy profile of the Kurdistan 
region will give detailed information about the existing energy trade and dependency 
relations in the Middle East. Therefore, it explains the importance of Kurdish gas 
production to Turkey’s, Iran’s, and Europe’s diversification of energy. In order to better 
understand the factors that influence natural gas policy in Kurdistan, this research adopts 
a case research design. In general, the research project considers Kurdistan a semi-
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autonomous natural gas producing area that is undergoing economic and political 
transition. For this research project, policy is not limited to government statements, 
legislation, and and directives, but extends to asking what the policy means to different 
actors, and what actually goes on before and during operation—in other words, the 
“actual” policy, and to what ends, and what influences and factors affected natural gas 
policy implementation. 
2.6 Positionality and Subjectivity 
My positionality as a Kurd, with both strong cultural ties to those being 
interviewed as well as language skills enable me to see through the eyes of those being 
studied (Perez 2012) and to look at the events as a participant observer because of my 
experience.  
Because the contrasting quantitative research methods, case study strategies lack 
exact tools and advices, and, as Yin (2003) notes, there is no comprehensive catalog for 
designing case studies. Therefore, I draw upon interviews with politicians and professors 
to analyze Kurdish gas plans and, to explain the situation such the sovereignty and 
controlling the boundary that distinguish the Kurdish and Arabia area. On June 13, 2014, 
the city of Kirkuk and the surrounding area was seized without firing a shot by the 
Peshmerga, and this lead to the control of the area of Kirkuk by Kurdistan special forces. 
The area control by the Peshmerga makes the situation between the central government 
and Kurdistan government more complicated especially in term of the sovereignty, as 
well as the complications over the jurisdiction of energy sources and wealth between the 
Iraqi government and the Peshmerga. To understand the relationship between sovereignty 
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and energy wealth in Kurdistan, I used some similar examples of energy related conflict.  
These examples to examine the problem such as the conflict perspective between Arab, 
Kurds and Turkmen on right to extract gas and oil in Kirkuk area, which as mentioned 
above, is called a disputed area in Iraqi constitution. Moreover, I will examine the 
hydrocarbon strategies of some countries that are close to Kurdistan Region and have 
some common interests in Kurdish natural gas, including Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran, and 
Russia.  
In additions, the KRG gas plans may face security issues. For example, the PKK 
has already attacked pipelines at the border between Turkey and Iraq. Moreover, there is 
the cost of building infrastructure like pipelines and storage facilities for the oil and gas 
sector. Ultimately, I discuss the potential Kurdish gas plans to determine whether or not 
they will lead Kurdistan Region’s developing an independent economy or vice versa. 
Moreover, I seek to determine whether oil and gas will result in the Kurdistan Region 
developing the status of an economically vibrant  country with a diversified economy that 
develops its tourism, agriculture, and other sectors, or will it use oil and gas revenues 
simply to fuel domestic consumption.  
The first objective will be to determine the complex energy relationships 
(internally and externally) between the Kurdistan Region and Iraq, Turkey, and Iran 
especially with respect to marketing its natural gas to the international market. 
For example, if I discover a significant relationship between Turkey and 
Kurdistan, it will be worthwhile to look into the importance of that relationship to the 
region and its association with more economic benefits. The analysis uses trade volume 
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data reflecting trade relations between Turkey and the region in 2012. Yidiz, the Minister 
of the Turkish Ministry of Energy, spoke at a major energy conference in Erbil about 
vital trade (of around U.S. $4 billion annually) between Turkey and the Kurdistan Region 
(Zulal 2012). I use the same trade data to show the significance of the relationships 
between other countries. 
The second objective will explore the relationship between Kurdistan as a 
landlocked location and the imposition of limitations on the alternative marketing of its 
gas and oil in the region. Paasche and Mansurbeg (2014) explain the concept of the 
region having no alternative but Turkey to sell its oil and gas to in order to access 
European markets. I will discuss sovereignty issues between Erbil and Iraqi government 
in Baghdad on rich dispute territories area which live together many different ethnic 
groups like Kurd, Arab and Turkmen. Moreover, the future possibilities of Syria’s deep 
water or Jordan’s Gulf of Aqaba are worthy of consideration as second big-hub transit 
countries for gas exports from the Kurdistan Region. Presently, no study exists that 
attempts to explore alternatives to Kurdish crude exports. 
 In summary, the analysis of the KRG’s foreign policy options and energy 
relationships with its neighbors will be a primary method for learning about Kurdistan’s 
energy strategies and their problems.  
2.7 Data Collection Sources 
 The research relies on mostly primary data collected from interviews, reports, 
statements, and media. Information was sought from the Ministry of Natural Resources in 
Kurdistan, international energy companies such as Exxon Mobil, Genel Energy, Dana 
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Gas, and DNO Company, and some nonprofit organizations such as the Door 
Organization for Petroleum Information of Kurdistan. 
 
2.7.1 Interviews:  
Interviews were carried out with experts working in oil and gas fields in 
Kurdistan. There were a total of thirteen interviews with about thirteen individuals (for 
more details see Table 1). Interview times totaled to about fifteen hours. Interview 
sessions include thorough note taking. Interviewees included members of the Ministry of 
Natural Resources in Kurdistan, members of Kurdistan’s parliament (including MP’s 
serving on the committee gas and oil affairs), and representatives of major energy 
companies (e.g., Dana Gas, Genel Energy, and other companies already invested in the 
region).  
The process of data analysis started with the transcription of all interviews 
followed by analysis of the data. The transcription process also allowed me to become 
acquainted with the data (Riessman 1993). Most of the interviews were recorded in 
Kurdish and subsequently translated from Kurdish to English by me. The interviews 
focused on a number of issues, for instance the quantity of the exports, prices and the deal 
regarding agreements and the quantity protocol. I asked MPs in the Kurdistan 
parliament’s gas and oil committee about the price of gas per meter, the price for every 
1,000 square meters, the companies that have already bought and those that will buy it. I 
have about four questions, including those on legal and political obstacles that may 
impact the KRG’s gas to Europe and Turkey. The interviews were semi-structured, in 
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that standard questions were supplemented by follow-up questions. The 'interview guide' 
I used included a list of questions and topics that needed to be covered during the 
conversation, usually in a particular order (Cohen and Crabtree 2006, 1). The interviewer 
follows the guide, but is able to follow topical trajectories in the conversation that may 
stray from the guide when he or she feels this is appropriate (Cohen and Crabtree 2006). 
Interviews were semi-scripted which allowed for the addition of questions during 
the interview process. This was important because in some instances follow-up questions 
were required for further data and clarification. Ultimately this allowed for the 
acquisition of richer data and better understanding. 
2.7.2 Primary Source Documents:  
The textual data gathered for this study included any type of document related to 
natural gas in Kurdistan. Documents were gathered from multiple sources including 
different organizations including foundations and centers of politics and energy (e.g., 
European Energy, the Oxford Institute of Energy Studies, and the Caspian Center for 
Energy and Environment). The purpose of the documents is to facilitate the analysis of 
KRG gas policy. The KRG sometimes hides information relating to gas sales to 
companies and countries. For instance, the KRG and Turkey had a contract that included 
Turkey purchasing Kurdistan’s gas for very cheap prices (100 Cubic meters for $150) 
(Roberts 2016). The Door Organization for Petroleum Information of Kurdistan disclosed 
this information. An independent organization is working in this area. All interviews 
transcripts, documents, and journal entries were saved as Microsoft Word files. 
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The aim of this study is to contribute to Kurdistan studies by collecting evidence 
on Kurdistan’s natural gas sector and the making of related policies. In the case of the 
Kurdish government, its natural gas policy is in its infancy, and therefore data will 
collects in this study should lay the ground for further research. The research is also 
designed to track complex domestic processes, politics and influences that have shaped 
the Kurdistan main economic sector. Finally, this study might help to compare KRG and 
with other countries’ experiences developing their natural gas sectors.  
 
Table 1. Simple Example of Data Sources and Collection Methods. Source Author. 
Data Source Data Source Collection 
Method 
Interview questions  
Representatives, and 
subject matter 
professionals, Public 
officials, company 
representatives from the 
gas industry, government 
and industry consultants, 
and petroleum 
organizations. Interviews 
taken for each members 
between 30 minutes -1 
hours and total will be less 
than 15 hours 
Interviews 1. What are the important 
issues facing gas sector? 
How do they notice, 
reason and problems? 
 
2. Are main threats 
economic, political, why? 
 
 
3. What is the role of 
parliament to develop gas 
sector? 
Gas contracts signed 
between the KRG and 
international energy 
companies 
 
 
 
 
 
Archival Research Contracts are authorized 
documents that regulate 
the relationship between 
the KRG and the 
international gas 
companies?  
 
1. What are the power 
relations between the KRG 
and the gas companies? 
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2. Who controls what/whom 
and how? 
 
3. How is revenue shared?  
 
News and energy reports Archival and Secondary 
Research 
Why is geopolitics 
important for the gas 
sector in Kurdistan? 
 
 
2.7.3 Data Analysis:  
Techniques are used to analyze the data from the case with Geographic 
Information System (GIS) and Excel spreadsheets to create maps of Kurdistan’s natural 
gas field and its products, as well as to create tables to show all gas fields produced at 
various points in time. The data were analyzed using the qualitative data analysis 
software MAXQDA. MAXQDA allowed for codes, categories, and themes to be 
developed from the data.  
2.7.4 Aims and Objectives:  
The aims of this dissertation are:  
1. To understand the natural gas policy of KRG from many perspectives.  
2. To discuss (internal & external geopolitical challenges) faced gas sector in the 
KRG. These goals are achieved by research the following objectives:  
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1. To understand the influence of neighboring states of Kurdistan and also energy 
companies on Kurdistan gas policy.  
2. To examine the causes and consequences of the political dispute between KRG 
and central government in Baghdad and identifying the major challenges 
associated within dispute on gas wealth (sovereignty). Also, and conflict between 
two political ruling parties in Kurdistan (PUK and PDK) on deal with resources in 
other side.  
This dissertation examines the energy strategies of Kurdistan and particularly how 
domestic and foreign factors shape KRG energy strategies.  
The main justification for using the case study approach was its appropriateness 
for exploring participants’ views on a particular subject (Shavelson and Towne 2002). 
Second, case study is a useful method “when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon 
within some real life context” (Yin 2003 p.1). However, potential shortcomings of using 
the case study approach arise in its reliance on personal interpretation of data and 
inferences is that results are unlikely to be generalizable, and are difficult to test for 
validity, and rarely offer a problem-solving prescription (Yin 2003, p.10)
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CHAPTER III 
NATURAL GAS POLICY OF KURDISTAN  
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Natural gas is a highly valued commodity globally, and its value is expected to 
increase in the future (Esen and Oral 2016). Kurdistan’s natural gas reserves of an 
estimated 5.7 tcm, or 3% of world reserves, are largely untapped (“KRG Ministry of 
Natural Resources” 2013). Kurdistan’s natural gas is enough for 260 years of future 
domestic use (Khncy 2016). If the KRG’s natural gas were properly developed, the 
resource could be important both for Kurdistan’s development and for consumers of 
natural gas abroad. However, in order to develop this resource, good policies would be 
needed. Kurdistan’s massive reserves are also of interest to neighboring countries, such 
as Turkey, as well as to larger markets farther away, such as the European Union. 
However, internal issues in Kurdistan, such as disputes between Kurdistan’s ruling 
parties and the Iraqi central government over revenue sharing and the type of contracts 
each side has signed with international companies, inhibits effective development of the 
resource. Moreover, territorial conflicts between KRG and Baghdad and the security of 
region present additional challenges.  
 This chapter examines the Kurdistan government's gas policy and the most 
important obstacles facing KRG’s desire to develop its natural gas industry. This chapter
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also attempts to understand how geography influences Kurdish gas policy. The internal 
geopolitical challenges and geo-economic situation of KRG are also discussed.
Many key issues remain unresolved between the KRG and the Federal 
Government of Iraq, including the right to export and the right to regulate gas resources. 
Another unresolved issue involves the disputed territories in Kirkuk and surrounding 
areas of Mosul and Delia, which are rich in oil and gas and home to Kurdish majority 
populations. Both Baghdad and Erbil have sought control of these territories. The 
territorial dispute was slated to be resolved in 2007, but that was postponed. In addition, 
internal challenges between the dominant parties in Kurdistan (PUK& PDK) over 
revenue/profit sharing as well as the role of international companies’ investments have 
further inhibited the gas sector’s development (Figure 2).  
 The aim of this chapter is to investigate the internal political challenges facing 
gas industry in Kurdistan. It answers the following research questions: 1) How does the 
Kurdistan region government natural gas policy function? and 2) What are the advantages 
and disadvantages of current policies, geopolitically and economically? 
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Figure 2. Oil Blocks and Gas Fields in Iraq- Kurdistan. Source: Author, based on “KRG 
Ministry of Natural Resources” (2013). 
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3.2 KRG Natural Gas Policy 
Kurdistan has very rich gas reserves. Some estimates report 5.7 tcm of gas, 
approximately 1.5% - 3% of the world's natural gas (“KRG Ministry of Natural 
Resources” 2013). In 2013, KRG signed numerous energy contracts with Turkey and 
European Union states without the permission of Baghdad. These contracts involved 
production-sharing agreements with foreign companies. Kurdistan successfully opened 
its energy sector to foreign investors in order to improve its economy with hydrocarbon 
revenues. The implementation of contracts and the growing number of investments led to 
large increase in Kurdistan’s oil production, and the extra oil revenues stabilized the 
domestic economy and politics.  
Kurdistan’s Ministry of Natural Resource has suggested that the geopolitical 
realities of Kurdistan’s landlocked geographic situation led to the government signing 
contracts with foreign companies to explore and to sell oil directly. Gas development in 
Kurdistan is less politically sensitive than oil, because  there are substantial domestic 
demands that must be satisfied before the politically sensitive matter of exports is even 
considered (Al-Khatteeb 2013). After the 2007 opening of the Kurdistan-Turkey oil 
pipeline, which was constructed first for gas exports not oil, Kurdistan was able to export 
oil to international markets also after it signed gas agreement with Genel energy to would 
export natural gas to Turkey in 2018.  
Kurdistan’s proven natural gas reserve could significantly improve the region’s 
socio-economic condition. It could also mean further natural resource security for Turkey 
and Europe. The November 2012 IEA report (“Iraq Energy Outlook” 2012) indicated in 
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its central scenario that Kurdistan might be able to start exporting natural gas by 2020. 
MNR and USGS estimate are much higher because they include unproved resources and 
exploration potential. The first priority of the KRG is to use its natural gas to generate 
electric power and meet domestic meet demands. Only after domestic demand is met 
would extra natural gas be allocated export for international markets. Genel Energy 
considers the Kurdish domestic demands may reach around 300-500 million cubic feet 
per day (about 3.1 to 5.2 bcm/y (Roberts 2016). Current commercial arrangements with 
Dana Gas provide for the KRG to pay a delivery rate for raw gas to Genel of $1.20 per 
thousand cubic feet, or around $xxx per thousand cubic meters (Roberts 2016). Electric 
power plants in Kurdistan account for around 42.7% of total gas consumption (Elliott and 
Beryl 2012). The rest of electricity is generated with gasoil, which costs KRG more than 
$15 million (Hama 2016). Converting all electricity to natural gas generation would 
generate substantial cost-savings for the KRG. 
Kurdistan plans to develop its gas separately from Baghdad and reach an 
agreement with Rosneft, a Russian energy company, on export. Its surplus gas could 
reach 30 bcf/day in 2020 (See Figure 3). The Ministry of Natural Resources plans to start 
exporting 10 bcm of its natural gas reserves to neighboring Turkey by either 2019 or 
2020 (Razzouk 2016). The following companies operate in Kurdistan in the gas 
development industry: Dana Gas, Genel Energy, Kar group and Spanish Repsol. The 
production costs of Kurdistan’s gas are also very cheap, which is another competitive 
advantage. The cost of gas production in Miran and Bina Bawi fields that are operated by 
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Genel Energy is low when compared to the cost of production associated with the Shah 
Deniz gas fields in Azerbaijan (Robert, 2013). 
In 2013 KRG signed agreements with Turkey on natural gas supplies. The 
agreements with Turkey were not just to fill Turkish market with Kurdish gas but rather 
to export extra natural gas to European markets. In light of criticisms from scholars and 
politicians that KRG should not rely on a single export market, KRG wants to diversify 
its export markets by exporting not only to Europe, but also potentially to Iran, and 
through Iran, to large Asian markets such as India, Pakistan and China.  
This strategy has been complicated in recent years by several factors. One is the 
considerable security issues facing the region, and another is low oil prices. About 2 
million refugees fled to Kurdistan during the Syrian civil war and other regional conflicts. 
KRG is also fighting against ISIS. Moreover, KRG owes international oil and gas 
companies’ payments for agreements known as sharing contract. All these challenges 
affects KRG natural gas plan.  
Nevertheless, KRG has been trying to invest more in its oil and gas sector to 
increase productions and export capabilities because it depends on oil revenues for a bulk 
of state funds. An example of the dependency can be seen in a recent budget short fall. 
The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) spends 70% of its budget on salaries and 
pensions to about 1.5 million wage earners (Wahab 2016) but during a period of low 
price of oil barrel from $100 to $25, the KRG was sharply criticized by state employees 
for a reduction of their salaries; workers demonstrated in the streets to register their 
displeasure.  
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A constitutional dispute with Baghdad over sharing revenues is another problem 
related to energy policy. Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution is supposed to normalize 
disputed areas but Baghdad has not fulfilled the terms of this Article, instead maintaining 
that revenues should be returned to Iraq government coffers (Abdulla 2016). As a result, 
KRG has also not paid international energy companies working in Kurdistan. Meanwhile, 
Crescent and Dana Gas, which were early entrants, had gas monetization and export 
strategies based on the KorMor and Chemchemal fields but were unable to make progress 
due to their dispute with the KRG. However, On March 21, 2018, they reached an 
agreement, a 10 year Gas Sales Agreement with KRG (Dana Gas 2018). KRG, under the 
pretext of ISIS attacks, has gained more oil and gas fields that are not in Kurdistan’s 
official area, such as Kirkuk oil and gas fields. This has further complicated relations 
between KRG and the Iraqi federal government because both sides claim that article 140 
gives them rights to invest and control those areas. 
 This is the main factor that led the Kurdistan government to approach and 
strengthen its economic and energy relationship with Turkey. According Kasayev 
(2010a), Kurdistan can satisfy only a part of Europe's strategic needs for natural gas 
during the next few decades. Even after the project starts working at full capacity, it will 
satisfy only 5% of Europe's demand in natural gas, while Russia meets the region`s needs 
at 26% (Kasayev 2010b). The Deputy Head of the Parliamentary Committee for Gas and 
Oil Affairs Shaban has a different view on this, saying that KRG could satisfy 30% of EU 
gas demand in the future (Hawrami 2016). 
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Another possibility for developing new markets is that KRG could send gas to 
other parts of Iraq. This is because most of the associated gas in the South of the country 
is unable to meet local demand (Al-Khatteeb 2013). Kurdistan can supply other Iraqi 
provinces with liquefied gas and even feed electricity generating stations, such as those in 
the provinces of Mosul and Saladin near Kurdistan. Another advantage of Kurdish gas is 
that most of it is non-associated gas. Non-associated gas—often called “dry gas”—is 
unmixed with oil in one reservoir. Non-associated gas is 20% of all Iraqi gas, and most of 
this output comes from Kurdistan. By 2035 total gas production from fields awarded by 
the KRG will reach 20 bcm to 29 bcm, the overwhelming majority of which is non-
associated (“Iraq Energy Outlook” 2012). Nonetheless, for energy security purpose, KRG 
needs to ensure it can meet local demand by 2030 (Manmy 2017). In term of price, 
Kurdistan gas is affordable. According to Genel energy estimates the cost of production 
is $5.50 per barrel of oil equivalent, or less than $1 per thousand standard cubic feet 
(Aublinger 2015). For example, in such fields production costs are less than $3 per barrel; 
the price of producing one barrel of oil in the fields of Taq Taq and Tawke did not reach 
3 dollars (Short 2015). This makes the overall production costs of gas and oil in 
Kurdistan very low in relative terms.  
However, whereas natural gas has relatively low production costs, developing the 
resource and selling it on international markets is quite difficult because it cannot be 
transported from well sites by truck (Liang et al. 2012) of the lack of adequate 
infrastructure, coupled with security and central government relations issues described 
above, Kurdistan’s gas industry has remained underdeveloped (Saad 2016). 
39 
 
In addition, there is there is very little being done by the Ministry of Natural 
Resources to increase natural gas productions in Kurdistan. The Chamchamal City 
project, a $6 billion proposal by Dana gas to develop a mega “gas city” with five sport 
stadiums among other developments, has been aborted because of legal woes (Hama 
2016). KRG’s legal issues with Dana gas, the only company that has invested Kurdistan’s 
natural gas, has slowed the company’s work so that that KRG likely could not export gas 
to market by 2019-2020 (Hama 2016). To meet that timeline, Dana would need to be 
working constantly. According to Hama, the natural gas plan for KRG has completely 
failed due these reasons. To know about KRG’s Gas Policy structure see (Figure 4). 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Kurdistan Gas Production. Based on some Scenarios from Al-Khatteeb (2013); 
Roberts (2016); “Genel Eenrgy” (2017). 
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Figure 4. Current Gas Policy Kurdistan-Iraq. Source: Author. 
 
 
3.3 Natural Gas Infrastructure of Kurdistan 
Natural gas production has attracted many consumers and companies because of 
increasing demand and its favorable properties for industrial uses as well as its 
cleanliness (“Natural Gas Demand NaturalGas.Org” 2013). Natural gas consumption is 
growing more than any other energy source. According to the annual data issued by 
Exxon Mobil in 2016, the demand for natural gas in world is increasing by 1.6 percent 
annually, in contrast, the demand for oil by 0.8 percent (“The Outlook for Energy: A 
View to 2040” 2016). However, because the global distribution of natural gas is uneven, 
functioning markets are needed to facilitate the trade of this commodity. In addition, 
long-term storage of large volumes of natural gas is very difficult. Kurdistan has no more 
than 176 km of natural gas pipelines to deliver natural gas from KorMor gas field to two 
plant power stations in Erbil and Bazian in Sulaymaniyah, while the Summail field, 
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which was supplying the Dohuk power plant, has run into production problems. If 
Kurdistan is to develop its natural gas to improve the economic and human condition, 
new pipelines and infrastructure will be needed. 
Kurdistan natural gas infrastructure is currently inadequate and in poor condition. 
Kurdistan needs to build storage, facilities and more pipelines to delivers natural gas from 
fields to end users. Yet strategic and thoughtful planning is also needed before new 
pipelines are constructed because of the high up-front costs and the fact that once they are 
built they cannot be moved. The Botas Turkish oil and gas Company announced 
construction of natural gas pipelines from Şırnak to the Kurdistan border (Rasheed 2016). 
This project is tied to an agreement between KRG and Turkey will supply Turkey with 
the cheapest natural gas in region. The establishment of natural gas export to Turkey 
would bring several benefits to Kurdistan. First, it would mean a real diversification of 
natural gas exports, which would provide solutions to the current infrastructural-
geographical limitations of Kurdistan. Second, Turkey, Europe, and USA may provide an 
influential boost to independence of Kurdistan through political support. Third, it will 
mean improvement of Kurdish gas infrastructure. However, there are many constraints 
associated with security and conflict between states in areas with differences of 
ideologies. Between 2007 and 2016, no pipeline capacity was added in the Kurdistan 
because of crises associated oil price declines and conflict between Iraq government and 
KRG on sharing petroleum revenues. Also, ISIS attacks have displaced people from Syria 
and southern Iraq. All of this has making improvement to natural gas infrastructure more 
challenging.  
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Another possibility is for the regional government to expand the capacity of the 
existing gas pipeline that carries gas from the KorMor field to power stations in Erbil and 
Sulaymaniyah instead of adding another new, expensive gas pipeline. Because of 
increase population of KRG demand of natural gas to generate electric power will 
increase by 2025 (“Reshaping Kurdistan’s Regional and Global Footprint: Energy” 
2013).  
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Table 2. Gas Fields in Kurdistan. Source: “KRG Ministry of Natural Resources” (2013). 
 
Gas Fields location proven Produce  
KorMor  1.8 TCF 350 Mmscf+15k 
Condensate Per Day 
Chamchamal  2.07 TCF 200 Mmscf per day  
Khurmala 3.669 TCF 100 mncfd of associated 
production comes from 
local firm KAR’s 
Khurmala assets- Local 
firm Kar also has 
expansion 
plans and is looking to 
double output 
of associated gas to around 
2.1bcm/y 
Kurdamir 2.3 TCF 150 mncfd (1.6bcm/y)- 
18bcm/y in 
2020 and exceed 25bcm/y 
by 2022 
Miran 3.5 TCF 6 bcm/year 
Bina Bawi 4.9TCF 5 bcm/year 
Shaikan 
 
1.3 TCF  
Summail  200 mmscf/d.- 40km, 36-
inch line 
which links the 
relinquished Summail gas 
field with the 1GW Dohuk 
power station 
Sheikh Adi 0.4 TCF  
Atrush  854  0.1  
Topkhana  55  1.7  
Taq Taq  579  0.1  
Miran and Bina Bawi  The two fields 
are slated to provide an 
initial 6.2bcm/y 
before reaching 12.4bcm/y 
over a two-year 
Ramp-up progress. 
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Figure 5. Gas Pipeline and Fields. Source: Author, Based on “KRG Ministry of Natural 
Resources” (2013). 
 
 
3.3.1 Electric Generation from Natural Gas: 
The transportation and distribution of natural gas domestically is performed by 
the Dana gas. There are twenty-eight turbines, 8 in Erbil, 8 in Sulaymaniyah, and 8 in 
Duhok. Electric power plants account for around 42.7% of the total gas consumption 
(Saad 2016). Because Kurdistan’s gas is under high pressure, it is highly suitable for 
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power generation. The 500 MW power station in Erbil and the 750 MW power station in 
Sulaimanyah run on natural gas. The Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Dahuk plants, powered by 
24 GE 9E gas turbines, produce more than 3,000 MW, the equivalent of the required 
annual energy needs of approximately 3 million households in Iraq (“GE’s Gas Turbines 
to Help Provide Uninterrupted Power in Iraq | Business Wire” 2018). The largest power 
generation station in Kurdistan is the Erbil Gas Power Station (EGPS), located about 22 
kilometers south of the capital city. The plant, rated at approximately 1,500 MW in 
combined cycle mode, is the largest power plant in Iraq. Most of the electricity is 
consumed in Erbil. (Electricity source Figure 5). The KRG had a plan as of 2013 to 
export electricity to liberated areas of Mosul and South West to Kirkuk to help these 
areas to alleviate power shortages while increasing revenues for Kurdistan. Also, the gas 
pipelines from Khurmala to Sumel power plant in Dahuk province has begun to carry out 
11 million cubic meters per day. The Duhok power station gas which is produces 1,500 
MW needs as much as 120 million cubic feet per day. In Sulaymaniyah Gas Power 
Station the project utilizes the gas turbine exhaust heat emissions to produce steam. This 
process increases the production without using extra fuel; it also reduces the amount of 
CO2 emissions and frees the environment of combustion emissions (“Erbil Gas Power 
Station (EGPS)” 2018). There are also two hydropower stations, but these only 
sporadically produce 180-200 MW, equivalent to 15% of the regions demand. If the KRG 
continues to work with Dana Gas to build a gas city in Chamchamal, it could double the 
current level of gas production. In Chamchamal dig one well in 2009, from 2010 to 2011 
work have been suspended. 
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Figure 6. Electric Generation Sources in 2016. Source: Kareem (2012); Husami 
(2007); “Iraq Energy Outlook” (2012). 
 
 
3.3.2 Subsidies:  
KRG is looking at a number of reform initiatives after declining oil price brought 
about massive impacts on the economy of region. KRG has been undertaking some 
reform right now such as reducing civil service salaries. KRG is looking at reducing 
subsidies, but not in politically sensitive sectors such as fuel, electricity, and the size of 
the civil service. Based on 2014 oil prices, KRG achieved over $3.4 billion of recurring 
annual savings in fuel costs for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) from the 
migration from diesel-to-gas to fuel power plants (“Pearl Petroleum Co. Ltd.” 2018).The 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions as a result of this switch at both power stations is 
30, 30%
50, 50%
10, 10%
10, 10%
Hydro
Natural gas
Solar
Gasoil
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valued at about $300 million annually (Pearl Petroleum 2017). The KRG has diversified 
source in many ways, including the reduction in electricity fuel subsidies and use of a 
biometrically registered electronic payment system for salaries. Nevertheless, the 
subsidies issue continues to be a problem. In the province of Dahuk, for example, due to 
a shortage of gas, a power generator paid about $100 million for the purchase of diesel, 
while at the same time the government unsustainably sells electricity that it pays 11 cents 
per KWH to consumers at 1.9 cents per kilowatt-hour. Moreover, KRG doesn't have 
appropriate mechanisms in place to collect electricity bill. See Electricity Price in Iraq- 
Kurdistan by Iraq currency (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Electricity Price in Iraq-Kurdistan by Iraq Currency. Source: Husami 
(2007). 
 
Price by $/kW.hr Price by New 
Iraqi Dinar/kW.hr 
Class (kW) 
0.08 100 1 - 1500 
0.33 400 1501-2100 
0.58 700 2001-3000 
 
 
3.3.3 Ways to Develop Natural Gas in Kurdistan:  
The prospects for Kurdistan playing an appreciable role in regional and global gas 
markets are significant. However, the region is a relative newcomer on the energy map, 
but several events in recent history set it up for becoming a major player. First, it freed 
the territory from Saddam Hussein’s military control in March 1991. Second, it 
challenged Iraq’s dominant role in the energy activity by signing contracts in 2007 with 
many foreign oil and gas companies. And third, it has been committed to the construction 
of the new pipelines in order to deliver gas and oil to the Turkey and Western markets. In 
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November 2013, KRG and Turkey signed a 50 year gas export agreement, which should 
KRG exporting natural gas to Turkey around 10bcm/y by 2017 (“KRG Plans 10 Bcm in 
Natural Gas Exports to Turkey in Two Years - ENERGY” 2013). There are many 
Turkish energy companies ready to invest in such a biggest gas fields in Kurdistan. The 
notable gas fields in Kurdistan which are Miran and Bina Bawi operated by Genel 
Energy. Development of the Miran and Bina Bawi fields with 350-400 bcm of gas 
reserves by Turkish-British company Genel Energy is ongoing with an estimated cost of 
US $2.9 billion (Short 2015). In the light of this development the KRG and Turkish 
government began negotiations to build the new pipelines to export gas from Kurdistan to 
Turkey (Rzayeva 2018). However, financing of a US$2.5 billion, 250 km pipeline 
remains unresolved, despite the fact that construction in Turkish territory has already 
begun, and completion is possible within a relatively short timeframe (Rzayeva 2018).  
 The primacy of energy security and supply diversity in regional politics has 
resulted in the construction of numerous pipelines over the years, including Turkish 
stream, Blue stream, and more recently, a new pipeline project between Azerbaijan and 
Turkey to carry out Gas from Shah Deniz to Turkey. This project is interesting because it 
is being developed with a 31 bcm capacity, which Azerbaijan alone cannot fill with the 
Shah Deniz fields (“TRANS ANATOLIAN NATURAL GAS PIPELINE PROJECT | 
TANAP” 2018). Therefore, the Turkish and Azeri investors want to find more partners. 
Hence, Kurdistan gas would appear in a good position as one of the sources to fill the 
TANAP with 3 to 6 bcm of natural gas. The main advantage of KRG’s participation in 
TANAP is its favorable geographical location in relation to the pipeline and the fact that 
49 
 
and Kurdistan gas would not need to transit through a third country before reaching 
TANAP. The closet point between KRG pipeline and TANAP is 580 km. 
The path of the pipeline addition to reach TANAP will be going throughout the 
Kurdish region from the west of Kars to Erzurum. KRG expects to be in a position to 
start delivering up to 20 billion cubic meters of gas a year into the Turkish and Europe 
markets (Roberts 2016). The two big gas fields Miran and Bina Bawi in Kurdistan 
(Figure 7) expect proven reserves of 230 bcm of gas in both fields to be ready for sale 
(“Genel Energy Plc Trading and Operations Update” 2014).The domestic consumption of 
gas in Kurdistan will be 35-500 million cubic feet per day and about 3.1 to 5.2 bcm /y 
(Short 2015). 
The price of Kurdistan’s gas is favorable, KRG will pay to deliver rate for raw gas 
to Genel of $1.20 per thousand cubic feet. One of the important things relates two fields 
(Miran and Bina Bawi) productions is the cheapest in term of productions in two fields, 
the cost for production for per thousand cubic feet will be less than $1 when compare 
with Azerbaijan offshore gas it means it is four times cheaper. KorMor fields production 
is also relatively inexpensive, with Dana gas company produceing around 340 million 
cubic feet per day equivalent around 3.5 bcm /y (“Kurdistan Region of Iraq” 2015).  
KRG wants to involve more important energy companies in the gas sector. The 
Spanish Repsol company is working to develop Kurdamir and Topkhana gas fields. 
According to Ministry of Natural Resources Kurdistan gas production will reach 20 bcm 
by 2020. There is an agreement between the Ministry of Natural Resources and Genel 
Energy to distribute gas in the Miran field to the following 6.6 billion cubic meters to 
50 
 
Turkey, 2.2 million cubic meters to Iran and the rest to local consumption estimated at 
11.8 billion cubic meters (“Genel Energy Plc Trading and Operations Update” 2014). 
Moreover, Kurdistan could establish a petrochemical industry from gas and help 
economic development by creating more job opportunities. Another option for 
landlocked Kurdistan is to export.  
Wahab (2016) suggests it is still better for KRG to deal with Iraq’s central 
government, because in the new constitution, the Kurdistan region is part of a federal Iraq 
and the KRG has no right to act as it pleases. Also, Iraqi has a sea outlet in Persian Gulf, 
which would allow Kurdistan to export gas to Asia’s growing markets. Additionally, he 
believes, KRG and the Iraqi Government should create a commission between Baghdad 
and Erbil to manage gas and oil sectors. Such a compromise would provide conflict 
resolution and a more stable entity working together (Wahab 2016). 
Some interviewees had a different view on KRG and Iraqi Government 
cooperation. Some stated it would be better for the government of Kurdistan to deal with 
Turkey in terms of energy as a substitute for Baghdad, because Turkey’s existing facility 
and infrastructures are ready to be used by Kurdistan for the export of its gas and oil.  
The Turkish government also has an understanding with the Kurdistan Regional 
Government, for example, expressing its willingness to buy Kurdish gas, without pre-
conditions on the quality, and it also expressed willingness to provide financial support to 
the KRG to develop its gas sector, because mutual benefits. In this way, KRG would 
follow an example set by Azerbaijan, which constructed infrastructure in order to export 
to Turkey and beyond. Under this model, according to one interviewee, with higher oil 
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prices and increasingly stability in the security situation, Kurdistan could, as Azerbaijan 
did, export gas to Turkey for 10-12 years without problems (Saad 2016). 
Another promising solution would be reforms that encourage saving hydrocarbon 
revenues in case oil and gas prices drop. This would involve setting up two wealth funds 
like those countries of Norway that will fund projects and other sectors. A regional 
government should consider a funding model that does not rely too heavily on consistent 
oil and gas revenues, by, for example, setting up a special “rainy day” fund for 
emergency situations as other countries rich in oil and gas have done to keep essential 
government services running. To advance this goal, the government should avoid issuing 
payments to every citizen indefinitely, which creates habitual dependence on government 
funds. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Miran and Bina Bawi Fields. Source: “KRI Gas Assets” (2016). 
 
52 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Natural Gas Reserve in Kurdistan. Source: Al-Khatteeb (2013). 
 
 
3.4 The Importance of The Kurdistan’s Natural Gas 
 
A few important issues about Kurdish natural gas must be raise. First, natural gas 
is more difficult to monetize than oil. Also, the quality of Kurdish gas is different from 
fields to others. According to deputy Iraqi oil ministry, Natural gas in the southern fields 
contains 22.6 percent of NGLs, 1.5 percent of CO2, and trace amounts of sulfur, while 
their northern counterparts contain 13.1 percent of NGLs, 4.3 percent of CO2, and 7.2 
percent of hydrogen sulfide (Al-Khatteeb 2013). The Kurdistan gas in Miran and Bani 
Bawi fields is sour, and costly to develop. Interviewee explained  
Nobody is willing to invest due to political risk. For example, the two grand 
gas fields in Kurdistan, which is Miran gas, has about 9-10 of CO2 and H2S 
[Hydrogen sulfide] in Bina Bawi around 20 Percent (Saad 2016) 
 
 
Table 4. Potential Gas Production in Kurdistan. Source: “KRG Ministry of 
Natural Resources” (2013). 
 
Kurdistan gas 
production /bcm 
2020 2025 2030 2035 
30 35 36 29 
Free Gas
Cap Gas
AG
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KorMor p/d 311 MMscf, - - - 
condensate 13,578 bbls - - - 
LPG daily average 
rate of 
729 MT - - - 
electricity 1,750 MW 
 
for 
millions 
of 
people 
 It is also achieving 
over US$ 3.4 
billions of recurring 
annual savings in fuel 
costs for the KRG for 
power generation, 
calculated to total 
close to US$ 16 
billion in savings from 
the start of 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Planned Gas Production in Kurdistan. Source: Al-Khatteeb (2013); 
Short (2015); “KRG Ministry of Natural Resources” (2013), “KRG Ministry of Natural 
Resources” (2013); Short (2015). 
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3.5 Kurdistan Gas Industry and Problems 
The main problems facing Kurdistan gas industry are the lack of transparency on 
the financial side of industry, and the current lack of modern and technically 
sophisticated infrastructure. There is little transparency in the processes of funding 
projects, selling gas, and revenue sharing. There is no accurate data published on gas 
productions by KRG and Dana Gas, and this contributes to a lack of transparency. 
However, there are annual reports, but they reflect only volumes produced estimate. 
The technical issues are seen in the costs to upgrade to required infrastructure. 
According to specialists, to build the 1 km pipeline to export gas cost KRG 1 million 
dollar (Saad 2016). KRG does not have enough money currently. The gas infrastructure 
need investments and KRG cannot borrow money because is not an independent state. 
KRG is unable to take loans from large multinational banking instutions such as the IMF 
or World Bank because of its lack of full sovereignty. KRG decided to build the new 
pipeline separate from the pipeline under Iraqi authority in Faysh Khabur to develop gas 
industry. This would be unsupportable for Baghdad. There are also other problems. There 
is no actual reliable estimate of proven Kurdish reserves or quality data, in part due to the 
data creation process lacking transparency and quality control (Hama 2016). The 
Ministry of Natural Resources has signed 52 oil and gas contracts but with no strategy in 
place for determining how to do so. Every contract should go through the Ministry of 
Foreign after discussion in parliament. If the parliament agrees, contracts oil and gas 
contracts should be signed by the Ministry of Natural Resources. Passing contracts by 
Parliament is the legitimate way to ratify them, and doing so would make the process 
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transparent (Hassan 2016). There is no transparency and legal documents for gas 
contracts and monopolies by political parties like PUK and PDK currently exist.  
One interviewee further highlighted issues standing in the way of developing 
Kurdish gas. First, there is no way to export gas because KRG needs $10 billion to build 
gas infrastructures to export gas to market. Second, the gas fields in Kurdistan contain 
many impurities. Money is needed to clean it because it has sulfur at the bottom well 
lines between 1-5 and 6-7 of gas, especially in Miran and Bani Bawi gas fields (Zulal 
2016). Kurdistan has sweet gas in limited fields such as in KorMor, Kurdamir, and 
Sarqala. Producing gas requires storage facilities and pipelines that are not compatible 
with oil. No one is ready to invest in Kurdistan because has a bad reputation related to 
unpaid wages to energy companies. Also, gas prices are historically low. Kurdistan gas 
needs $20-25 billion to develop infrastructure and storage. Another problem is that KRG 
is looking for revenue rather than thinking about how do develop a sustainable economic 
basis, such as by developing its petrochemical sector. Natural gas is one main source 
material for the petrochemical sector.  
KRG cannot succeed in the gas sector like the oil sector (Wahab 2016).Oil 
companies looking for a fast return on investment do not want to invest $10-20 billion 
over 20 years (Saad 2016). An interviewees said:  
 
The big oil companies are looking for oil in Kurdistan not for gas, because the oil 
is easy to profit from. Gas costs because technologies are needed for its 
production, and for this reason when the companies discover the gas instead of the 
oil, they give up and say to the government I will not invest in the gas sector. In 
the event of an improvement in the price of oil, the government can use oil 
revenue to develop a gas sector (Saad 2016). 
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Estimates of KRG’s reserves also vary widely. While an investor estimates there 
are 80 tcf, KRG claims more than 160 tcf (Manmy 2017). Huge investments are needed 
in order to make the sector viable, in general, Kurdistan‘s gas development need stable 
politics and a secure investment environment.  More, the security, financial and 
locational issues hamper development the gas sector. Geography contributes to 
vulnerability of pipelines, oil prices, terrorism, corruption and economic mismanagement. 
Kurdistan’s economy is heavily dependent on hydrocarbon exports, it accounts for 95% 
of revenues. Those economic problems led KRG not to pay salaries and owe by gas and 
oil companies. The economy of Kurdistan is very vulnerable because its hydrocarbon 
trade accounts for 98% of all exports earnings and 90% of budget revenues (Dziadosz 
2017). KRG has also not paid debt owed to foreign international energy companies.  
In Kurdistan, top leaders usually to create oil and gas policy. The second issue 
involves the intervention of political parties in the gas and oil deals, as well as appointing 
persons who are subordinated to the parties that do not have sufficient experience in the 
places of the task that manages the gas and oil sector and may create a situation of 
corruption that may affect the process of building the oil and gas plant and its 
administration. 
Corruption remains a significant problem in Kurdistan. Elites rarely hide their 
misbehaviors. For example, one of the earliest forms of corruption associated with the 
energy sector came from Hawrami’s relationships with DNO Company. Hawrami 
(Ministry of Natural Resources of KRG) was given bribes in the form of money. The 
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most common example of corruption involves the divesting of energy revenues to bank 
accounts outside Kurdistan. 
The problems with this system is that political-party objectives and those of the 
energy sectors often do not match, which leads to internecine elitist conflict and societal 
turmoil. For example, Barzani’s son-in-law and Talabani’s son led Kurdistan’s sovereign 
wealth fund, which should have been under parliamenty control. They were still in 
control even after national demonstrations. The sovereign wealth fund has been 
undergoing some changes that include reducing bureaucracy and improving the fund’s 
“strategy” in developing the region’s economy, such as by hiring an international 
company to audit its funds. To the Government of Kurdistan in the years before the war 
on ISIS, urging them to use their sovereignty and wealth to serve the community but the 
war, corruption, problems with energy companies, as well as the price of oil all affected 
on government imports and affect negatively on the development of the gas industry. 
KRG has shortcomings in the management of the oil and gas file to be non-transparent as 
well as my signing of the secret contracts with Turkey away from the control of the 
Government of Baghdad even hidden from the Parliament of Kurdistan, a legitimate 
representative of the people of Kurdistan.  
3.6 Dana Gas Company 
Dana gas is the largest company operating in the Kurdistan natural gas sector. 
Dana gas was producers most of Kurdistan’s natural gas. Dana Gas Company, according 
to an agreement with the Kurdistan Government, has the responsibility to supply all 
power stations in the region with natural gas. In 2008 the company started to produce gas 
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in KorMor field. The 176 km of pipeline was established by Dana gas and affiliates such 
as Austria’s OMV and Hungary MOL to interconnect and feed all three power plants in 
Erbil and Sulaymaniyah with gas (“Kurdistan Region of Iraq” 2015). The Pearl 
consortium has rights to develop gas and petroleum from the Khor Mor and Chemchemal 
fields for 25 years (“Pearl Petroleum Co. Ltd.” 2018). Under the terms of the agreement, 
Crescent Petroleum and Dana Gas were given exclusive rights to appraise, develop, 
process, market and sell petroleum from the substantial KorMor and Chemchemal blocks. 
This was the first phase to provide natural gas supplies to fuel two major domestic 
electric power generation plants being built in Erbil and Chamchamal, It also supported 
for local industries and export. Dana gas sells LPG Gas by itself around 1400 ton /d. It 
also sells condensate gas 470 ton /d less than 370$ (Hama 2016). 
 Furthermore, after KRG settled a case with Dana Gas by paying $1 billion to 
Pearl Consortium starts working at full capacity it will satisfy 5% of Europe's demand in 
natural gas or enough to supply the whole of Europe for one year (Zhdannikov 2017a). 
Russia only meets 26% of the region`s needs (Dickel et al. 2014). Moreover, KRG has 
focused its attention on gas, announcing that a 461 –million square –foot site for building 
the Kurdistan gas city has been designed for development cities by crescent petroleum 
and Dana gas (“Dana Gas and Crescent Petroleum Announce Establishment of 461 
Million Square Feet Site for Kurdistan Gas City” 2008). The Kurdish city includes 
industrial, residential and commercial components at an estimated cost of over $3 billion 
(“Dana Gas and Crescent Petroleum Announce Establishment of 461 Million Square Feet 
Site for Kurdistan Gas City” 2008).  
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 In light of ongoing disputes, KRG and Dana gas opened a claim in London Court 
of International Arbitration. Dana gas has won an arbitration award against the Kurdistan 
Regional Government that could potentially unlock almost $2 bn in unpaid invoices (Kerr 
2015). But KRG claims that Dana gas has shared interest with five companies (35% Dana 
gas, 15% crescent, 10% ONV, 10% MOL, 10% RW) without gaining permission first 
from KRG, which controls 20% of the venture. However, the most significant challenge 
is the pricing of long-term contracts with Dana gas in the current era of a global 
abundance of gas supply. Dana Gas said the consortium had invested $1.2bn to produce 
the equivalent of 150m barrels of gas and petroleum liquids, benefiting the local economy 
(Kerr 2015). However, KRG has refused the Dana Gas allegation and they said Dana gas 
want to increase its market shares. As a result, KRG could not pay money to secure 
enough natural gas feedstock for electricity generation, which meant that only 8 to 10 
hours of electricity per day was being produced.  
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Figure 10. KorMor Gas Field and Gas Active Pipeline. Source: Author, Based On 
“Kurdistan Region of Iraq” (2015). 
 
 
3.7 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Kurdistan Democratic Party 
 
The PUK and PDK have formed a government after the removal of Saddam 
Hussein from authority in Iraq. They became principal partners in governing. The Two 
big families in Kurdistan, the Barzani and Talabani families, have strongly influenced the 
energy sector in Kurdistan. Oil and gas is a symbol of Western interests and it is the 
lifeblood of Kurdistan’s regional government. The two families were ruling the region for 
almost three decades, and they consider oil and gas resources to be essential to their 
power. These resources have been a significant source of revenue for their parties. The 
KDP and PUK have each received about $4 million from KRG. The KDP’s control over 
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the oil portfolio has been extremely important in increasing its powers versus the rival 
PUK. The KDP has also been able to slow down the development of hydrocarbon 
resources in the Southern KRI versus those in its northern heartlands. 
At the same time, there has been dispute a concerning sharing money. Some 
members of the Patrice Union Party and Gorran claim that 80% of the Kurdistan gas lies 
in the area of their influence and known as a green area such as Galib as member of 
Goren opposing party (Mohammed 2016). Other member responded to these allegations, 
claiming that about 68% of budgets from oil and gas came from PDK yellow areas 
(Mansurbeg 2016). This conflict between them is yet another factor that has kept the 
sector undeveloped.  
It remains to be seen how the recent acquisition of oil fields in the PUK-
dominated Kirkuk, affects the balance of power between the three major parties (KDP, 
PUK, and Gorran). The two Kurdish parties have their own companies that have a role in 
controlling most of the vital economic sectors and are collecting special revenues in the 
oil and gas sector. The two important are the KAR Group and Qaiwan Company which 
are active in oil development and refining and also to distribution of PLG gas. Although 
it creates openings for ‘crony capitalism’ and patronage politics, the development of local 
private oil sector capabilities can help satisfy nationalist demands while avoiding the 
consequences of a monopoly state company.  
The Barzani family has ties with America and Turkey, but the Talabani family by 
virtue of the geographical proximity of the region their influence from Iran has a strong 
relationship with Tehran. In the latest incident of the Kirkuk attack by the Iraqi army , 
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there was coordination with members of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan against the 
forces of Barzani (“PM Abadi Meets with Bafel Talabani, Eldest Son of PUK Founder” 
2018). The Kurdistan Democratic Party is also close to the Turkish Justice Party headed 
by Recep Erdogan. At the same time the National Union Party is growing a relationship 
of the PKK opposed to Turkey. The Justice Party has a long lasting impact on the 
development of the economic relations of Kurdistan with Ankara in particular in the field 
of energy. In fact, in the last ten years energy is the key to mutual relations between the 
Kurdish and Turkish sides (Jozel 2014). 
In Kurdistan elites are accustomed to generating energy policy and forming 
corporate frameworks in the interest of the single-party platform. In Kurdistan the PDK 
main party goals are greatly intertwined with energy policy and relations with energy 
firms. The problem with this system is that political party objectives and those of the 
energy sectors do not often match. This could lead to internal elitist strife or societal 
unrest. When the elites are in conflict, the side with the privilege of “legitimate violence” 
of intent in the form of access to the military usually prevails (Luckham 2017). KRG 
politics and oil and gas policy are known for being among the least transparent in the 
region. Despite the abundance of gas and oil, with exports of oil near 600 thousand 
barrels per day, government employees receive their salaries about every 45 days at half 
the rate they are owed. The political system in Kurdistan is a clannish system. Talabani 
family and Barzani family gather around them relatives and people from their clan. And 
the energy policy in Kurdistan is affected by Barzani family more than Talabani. Barzani 
considers energy the key to obtaining the final independence of Kurdistan as an 
63 
 
independent state. For example one of interviewees claims Barzani’s nephew and his 
little son Talabani is the supervisor of the oil revenues of a region with control over most 
of the commercial companies and banks, such as the Bank of Kurdistan, which saves 
money selling oil and gas (Hassan 2016). In addition, the sovereign wealth fund for the 
conservation of oil and gas has not been reformed to free it from interference despite a 
decision by the parliament to reform it, which would reduce cases of corruption and 
bureaucracy. 
On the other hand, dramatic change took place when the two biggest party’s 
headquarters in Sulaymaniyah signed agreements without ally party PDK. On May 17, 
2016 the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, or PUK, and the Change Movement, also known 
locally as Gorran, issued a statement saying they had signed an agreement that would see 
them unite their two blocs in the Iraqi Kurdish Parliament (“Political Union in Kurdistan 
– Peace, or Civil War? | Iraq Business News” 2016). There are even quarrels between the 
two parties and the opposition over the division of oil and gas revenues and their unequal 
distribution between their areas of influence, for example, some claim that most of the 
gas fields giant are located in the Sulaymaniyah area of influence of the Patriotic Union 
of Kurdistan and the opposition of private movement changed. Goran opposition Party 
and a member of the government of Sulaymaniyah, said that the fields of Kurdamir, 
Topkhana, and Chia Surkh with Pulkhana located in Karamian 70% it means are located 
in a green range. This means that there is geographical injustice between the two regions 
(Mohammed 2016). 
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 On the other hand, the PDK members disputed the allegation that 60% of oil and 
gas budget come from PDK strongholds. In the end, even within the KRI, the control of 
its hydrocarbon resources has strengthened the KDP versus the PUK, but both of the 
established parties have benefited from opportunities for patronage and corruption. 
Kurdistan has a long history of disagreement between parties on how to manage 
resources. Iraqi Kurdistan two big parties divided by two side of influence Turkey and 
Iran. In the last dispute between Erbil and Baghdad the issue been display in very clear 
way which led PUK support and cooperate with Baghdad to regain the most the oil and 
gas fields in Kirkuk and Mosul. This altitude against PDK that scholars consider Barzani 
U.S and Turkish alley. For more details see area of influence two parties in Kurdistan and 
election results (Figure 11). 
One interviewee said: “Also KRG have the internal power struggles between the 
two big parties, PUK and PDK. They are divided over gas policy relations with Iran, 
Turkey and Baghdad”(Wahab 2016) 
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Figure 11. Top Two Party Voting Results in Kurdistan: 1992-2003. Source: Author. 
 
Table 5. Kurdistan Political Party’s Election Result 2013. Source: “Independent High 
Electoral Commission of Iraq Announces Complete Election Results” (2013). 
 
Party Votes  seats 
PDK 743,000 38 
Goran 476,000 24 
PUK 350,000 18 
Kurdistan Islamic 
Union 
186,000 10 
Kurdistan Islamic 
group 
118,000 6 
Socialist  12,398 1 
Azadi 12,200 1 
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3.8 Baghdad and Erbil Conflict on Petroleum Revenues Sharing 
The main problem between Erbil and Baghdad is the interpretation of the Iraqi 
Constitution about oil and gas agreements with international companies. Iraqi authority 
claims that articles 110,112 and 115 of constitution emphasize the power of the central 
governed in Baghdad. The KRG interprets Article 111, that oil and gas belong to all 
Iraqis, and the Article 112 (that suggests Iraq come up with a way to share revenues) to 
mean that it only owes Baghdad a portion of the oil it produces (Schenke 2011). The 
central government in Baghdad claims that it has the right to full sovereignty to develop 
fields throughout Iraq, including Kurdistan, which conforms to the Constitution and to 
strengthen the sovereignty of all powers to preserve the unity of the country. 
 On the other hand, as a semi-autonomous region, Kurdistan has passed 
hydrocarbon law in local parliament allowing it to launch a domestic energy sector and 
generate gas and oil revenues. KRG has a different a view believing that KRG has all 
rights to explore, export and develop gas and oil in the Kurdistan autonomous region as 
long as it shares the petroleum revenues with federal government in Baghdad. The KRG 
has signed more than 40 PSAs without seeking approval from Baghdad (“Iraq and the 
Kurds: The High-Stakes Hydrocarbons Gambit” 2012). In the meanwhile, Kurdish 
government takes 17% of Iraq’s national budget, which makes the majority of KRG 
budget but right now the central government cut the budget of KRG. Most budget of the 
Kurdistan government comes from selling oil but deciding how to share revenues has 
placed many obstacles in front of developing natural gas for KRG more than Baghdad. 
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 The dispute between the two governments is over money and land, but the heart 
of the matter is that Kurdistan wants independence from the central government in full, 
but the central government wants to exercise full sovereignty in the state. Krasner (1999) 
differentiates between four meanings of sovereignty: domestic sovereignty, 
interdependence sovereignty, international legal sovereignty, and Westphalia sovereignty. 
The Kurdistan region after 1992, has been exercising internal sovereignty but still does 
not they have right to deal international treaties. Likewise, it cannot borrow money to 
develop its natural gas project. However, the Kurdistan region is determined to keep its 
acquired partial sovereignty as a part of its quest to justify its near-independent status. 
For that purpose, the region relies on its internal sovereignty and ability to act 
independently even when lacking international recognition. On the other hand, the 
governments of Kurdistan acts similarly to a sovereign state, for example, through its 
ability to sell oil and gas independently, sending its troops during the Syrian war to the 
city of Kubani -Syrian to liberation from ISIS. Additional, the existing of representatives 
and consulates of the superpowers in Kurdistan, this all indicates that Kurdistan has the 
large and important role in the Middle East. Also, there are attempts by the government 
of Kurdistan to show self and to gain more local sovereignty, including the launch of free 
press, market freedom and legislation in parliament to guarantee and preserve the rights 
of minorities and the right of women.  
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3.9 Interview Analysis 
Interviewee explained more about KRG gas policy: 
 
 
For example, the government signed a 20-year gas purchase contract and paid 
$1,000 for each 1000 cubic feet of gas, but most companies do not trust a 
provincial government because it does not have enough money to develop gas. 
But if Turkey is willing to pay $ 10 for each meter of gas and KRG paid $ 7 for 
each meter, then KRG could during this time support its gas sector. All the energy 
companies make money from oil not gas. For instant, transporting from Miran gas 
field to Turkish border requires 4 hundred billion dollars to establish pipeline 
(Saad 2016). 
 
 
Most respondents interviewed about KRG gas policy said the policy not been 
managed perfectly. One of the interviewee worried that, “the Minister of Natural 
Resources has failed to deal with companies that are already invested in the gas sector. 
Recently, Dana Gas Company won 2 billion dollars from KRG is a lawsuit in the London 
Court of International Arbitration.” 
Another interviewee said, “It’s a completely failed plan. The best evidence is our 
production is not developed. We lost 2 million dollars to Dana gas and we are still in 
other court cases” (Hama 2016). 
Many interviewees blame the current Ministry of Natural Resources for the 
unsuccessful development of the gas sector. Most agreed that Kurdistan gas policy has 
not been active and the Minster of Natural Resource should take most of the 
responsibility for the failed policy. Interviewees also blame the current Ministry of 
Natural Resources for not taking advantage of gas resources even for generation of 
domestic electricity for two power station in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. One interviewee 
detailed: 
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Nobody knows about the detail of gas agreements between Kurdistan and Turkey 
and others; just the ministry of Kurdistan Natural Resources knows (Ashty 
Hawrami) and the ministry hides it from parliament audit (Hama 2016). 
 
 
Some interviewees suggested that poor infrastructure of petroleum impacts on the 
performance of Kurdistan’s gas sector. Hama (2016) elaborated more: 
 
The gas industry in the region suffers from a poorly planned strategy. Many 
things remain unestablished after Kurdistan’s oil and gas law have been approved 
in Kurdistan parliament since 2007. For example, there is still no Audit 
Committee of oil and gas imports. 
 
 
3.10 Summary of Issues 
 
Traditional geographic elements such as location are obstructing KRG from using 
natural gas exports to further its ambition to uphold its sovereignty over the region’s 
natural gas and oil. However, the tension between Erbil and Baghdad threats progress of 
development Kurdish gas sector for natural gas progress in Kurdistan. Many companies 
are afraid of the unstable relationship between KRG and Baghdad on the contracts.  
Other obstacles between KRG and international energy companies is conflict over 
revenues from contracts and late payments to companies. From Baghdad's perspective, 
this is an important sovereign right, surely not to be reliable to a larger and more 
powerful national and sectarian challenger to the Kurdistan. The Iraqi central government 
has so far relied on threats to blacklist foreign firms that unilaterally sign energy 
exploration and production deals with the Kurdistan Regional Government from energy 
development in the south (“A Looming Showdown Over Iraqi Kurdish Oil Exports” 
2013). Before 2003 U.S and Turkey wanted Iraq as cohesive a state but now this attempt 
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is unlikely because Kurdistan as a de facto region KRG already sell its oil without 
Baghdad approval. This means the international community came to believe that KRG is 
a political and economic entity in Middle East should have recognition.  
Furthermore, KRG and Baghdad are still working together in some way. In 
February 2017 an agreement saw 40,000 barrel output per day (bopd) of NOC crude 
transported to KAR’s refineries West of Erbil, generating fuel for Mosul and liberated 
areas to offset the losses of the Baiji and Qayyarah refineries (“A Focused Business” 
2016). Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki wrote a letter to U.S. President Obama 
asking him to stop ExxonMobil from dealing with the KRG. The Obama administration 
advised companies about the legal and stability risks involved in dealing with KRG 
without Baghdad’s approval. In addition, the relationship between Baghdad and Erbil is 
crucial to both. However, despite this friendship with Turkey and European countries, 
Erbil cannot turn its back on Baghdad. Kurdistan was compelled to make ties with 
Baghdad to export future gas and oil to Asian market. 
3.11 Gas Fields and Disputed Territories (Kirkuk-Mosul) 
The disputed territories are those between Kurdistan Region and Iraq over which 
the terms of territorial control are not agreed upon by KRG and Iraqi central government. 
Different religious and ethnic groups live in these territories, but Kurds constitute a 
majority in most of the disputed areas. In early 16 October 2017, Iraqi forces and Popular 
Mobilization Forces backed by Iran re-took oil and gas fields in disputed territory from 
the Kurdistan Regional Government. But Rosneft Company will push ahead with plans to 
drill for gas and oil in Kurdistan despite rising instability in the autonomous region. KRG 
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oil produce with Kirkuk disputed area around 550,000 but without Kirkuk it will be 
235,000 (Ajrash and Dipaola 2017). Production dropped at least half after October 17, 
2017 to below 250,000 b/d. The major sticking point for Kurds and Arabs vis-à-vis 
Kurdish sovereignty is the Kirkuk and Mosul problem. The Iraqi government and the 
KRG are in disagreement as to where the exact provincial boundaries are. The problem is 
with enclaves of Kurd and Arab families who do not desire to be governed by other 
ethnicity. For example, Turkish assume that Kirkuk is home to a sizable Turkmen 
population and the expansion of Kurdish control over the city had been an important red 
line for Turkish foreign policy because it is rich in resources and Turkey wants to 
maintain leverage there. Turkey does not want resources going to Iran instead. Breaking 
the red line would mean Turkey would not cooperate with the KRG in many fronts. The 
Kurdistan government region after 2003 administratively has powers in Kurdish 
territories in cities and towns in Diyala, Mosul and Kirkuk. During the period of the 
Baathist regime, Baathists persecuted Kurds from taking advantages of oil and gas in the 
territories near Kirkuk and Mosul. 
Currently the dispute over those areas between KRG and central Government 
make the relationship between them more complicated especially such as to who will 
manage these oil and gas fields and also on delineation on border. Historically, those 
areas are very oil and gas rich. The two big oil and gas fields are Avana and Baba 
Gurgur. Before 2003 they were run by Baghdad but after ISIS assaults in 2014 KRG took 
control over the two fields. The rights of extracting gas and oil in the disputed areas has 
been another problem between the government of Kurdistan and Baghdad. The conflicts 
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over disputed areas between KRG and Baghdad paved the way to involve many foreign 
influences over the progress of the petroleum industry. For example, Turkey has been 
using Kirkuk’s Turkoman as its main vehicle of leverage to make sure Kirkuk stays 
outside Kurdish control (“Fight or Flight: The Desperate Plight of Iraq’s ‘Generation 
2000’” 2016). The crisis between Baghdad and Erbil intensified this time when Baghdad 
signed a contract with a British oil exploration and extraction company in the disputed 
Kirkuk region. On the other hand, the government of Kurdistan has offered more 
concessions to US companies and its associates in this sector, including the company, 
ExxonMobil. But in the Constitution and Article 140, both governments have no right to 
extract until they reach full normalization in this region.  
Those issues have a significant impact on how and when Iraq and KRG will 
develop its natural gas resources. The tensions between Peshmerga forces and the Iraqi 
army around Kirkuk have been increasing. Because the main oil and gas pipeline go 
through this area also known as (Kirkuk-Yumurtalık) the pipeline has been targeted by 
terrorist groups to hit income stream to Baghdad and Erbil. The Kurdistan Regional 
Government took advantage of the war on ISIS, calling for the control of more land in the 
disputed area and the last control of the fields of Ain Zalah and Ain Sfni in the borders of 
the province of Nineveh (Khncy 2016). Beside, most of KRG s proven oil and gas 
reserves is located in the South part of the dispute area such as KorMor gas, Bai Hassan 
others fields.  
Conversely, Kurdistan’s neighbors don’t want KRG to control all disputed areas 
like Kirkuk. As Turkish officials see it, full Kurdish control over Kirkuk and its oil would 
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be an important step toward Kurdish independence, an outcome they wish to avoid at all 
cost (Hiltermann and Fantappie 2008). The disputed territories can be part of Kurdistan 
Region or part of Iraq since it is agreed by both sides according to article 140 in Iraqi 
constitution, up to day. The status of the disputed territories remained the same until the 
dawn ‘Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIS’ in June 2014 because the conflict is 
over land, sovereignty, and control over resources. Peshmerga army re-gained from 
primary defeat to repel Daesh and catch many areas of the disputed territories which were 
before controlled by the Iraqi central government. Daesh created an opportunity for 
Kurdistan Region to extend behind its March 2003 border. “Kurds have increased the size 
of the region they control in Iraq by around 40% since 2014,” and control over these 
disputed must be resolve in the future (Coles and Kalin 2016). Kurds are now a de facto 
power in much of the disputed territories.  
3.11.1 Interviews Analysis: 
The results show that multiple issues confront the gas sector including: Internal 
geopolitical issues between KRG and Iraqi central government on many things. First, 
constitutionally there are points of disagreement between the KRG and Iraqi central 
government, especially Articles 111 and 112 (“Iraq Constitution” 2005).  
To investigate questions surrounding constitutional politics of energy my 
interview targeted the Kurdistan and Iraqi gas and oil committee member in Parliament 
and also scholars active in this sector. Second, most interviewees agree that the dispute 
between Erbil and Baghdad is do developing gas sector in Kurdistan are such each side 
sign contracts individually with different type of agreements. Kurdistan contracts differ 
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from Baghdad’s. Kurdistan signs sharing contracts with companies and Baghdad sign 
service contracts. Concerning the interpretation of the Iraqi constitutions, especially 
Articles 111,112  related to Iraq’s hydrocarbon sector,  
Interviewee (Abdulla 2016) explained 
 
All revenues should be distributed to all Iraq people. Revenues from Duhok or 
other places should be allocated based on the population in each province. There 
are political problems between KRG and the Iraqi government that related to the 
constitution of new Iraq. Article 112 of the Iraqi constitution gives provinces the 
right to manage natural resources and the revenues generated from production, by 
law. But there is no legislation to arrange for that article. This is why the Iraqi 
government and KRG interpret the article in their respective ways. This means the 
problem is political and legal. 
 
 
Dispute over control of lands between Baghdad and Erbil is another challenge affecting 
energy policy. In many cases resource nationalism has been a leading cause of conflict 
among the people in oil and gas rich areas. Natali (2015) argues that Kurdistan region is 
not a sovereign entity and conflict over resources among Iraqi people may create a long 
time civil war. One interviewee said, “KRG does not have external sovereignty but they 
have some internal sovereignty. The KRG lacks support from the Iraqi central 
government.” 
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Figure 12. Disputed Areas between Federal Government and KRG. Source: 
Author, based on “In Kirkuk, the Next Phase of Iraq’s Conflict Begins” (2017). 
 
 
3.12. Iraq 
Iraq is the world’s third largest oil exporter, after Saudi Arabia and Russia, and 
could overtake Russia’s position by 2030. By the year 2035, Iraq is projected to become 
the largest contributor to global growth of oil supply (“Iraq Energy Outlook” 2012). 
Iraq’s proven reserves of conventional natural gas amount to 3.4 trillion cubic meters 
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(tcm), or about 1.5% of the world total placing Iraq 13th among global reserve-holders 
(“Iraq Energy Outlook” 2012). This means that almost 40% of the resources have yet to 
be found are expected to be in non-associated gas fields. In January 2013, Iraq’s gas 
production reached 2.234 bcf/day (Al-Khatteeb 2013). The cost of oil production in Iraq 
is among the lowest—in 2008, extraction costs per barrel averaged at $1.8 in Saudi 
Arabia and $31.4 in Canada (Petroff 2015). The cost of Iraq’s oil production is lower 
than in Angola, Norway and the United States, and much lower than offshore oilfields. In 
comparison, the huge reserve natural gas in south is as appraisal in 2-3 trillion cubic 
meters of gas, which makes about more than 75% of all gas reserve in Iraq. 
In terms of infrastructure, Iraq has one extended gas pipeline from Basra to 
Mosul. The oil pipeline is 1775 km and LPG pipeline is 1400 km. That is not sufficient to 
secure and develop Iraq’s gas potential. Like Kurdistant, they lack sufficient storage 
facilities and infrastructure. At present, Iraq has no underground gas storage: a facility 
built in the 1980s in the Kirkuk region for LPG, which held a surplus during summer 
months for retrieval during periods of peak demand in the winter, is no longer in use. The 
gas pipeline capacity 20 bcm/y BOTAS begun construction to interconnect 185-km with 
grid at Mardin to Kurdistan border may use it by central government in Baghdad. The 
Iraq - Turkey Crude Oil Pipeline system consists of two parallel 986 km-long pipelines 
built in 1973 and 1987 (Bowlus 2017). 
These pipelines transport Iraqi crude oil to the Ceyhan (Yumurtalık) Marine 
Terminal with a total annual capacity of 70.9 Million tons/year as of 1987 (Austivk and 
Rzayeva 2016). The tension relations with KRG make Iraqi petroleum not progress, for 
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instant, Iraqi government retaliated against the first independence oil sales in 2014 for 
certain will they do the same for sell and exporting natural gas Kurdistan.  
One solution to the problem between both may as alternative for the KRG would 
be to export gas to federal Iraq. Based on its geographic proximity, especially to the 
southern part of the KRI, and its high-priced gas import deal with Iran, federal Iraq could 
potentially be a more lucrative market. Otherwise, the KRG could step up its domestic 
power generation and export electricity to federal Iraq (which suffers from severe 
shortages) and/or Turkey. Baghdad’s has only option which is Kurdistan for exporting 
Kirkuk crude was to use the connection to the KRG’s new pipeline. Because the Kurdish 
Peshmerga forces had taken physical control of most of the Iraqi fields around Kirkuk to 
deny them to ISIS.  
Periods of cooperation with Baghdad have been interrupted by serious disputes 
and breakdowns of relations. That push the KRG to find the new energy partner which is 
Turkey, Kurdistan in 2014, exported oil for the first time through Turkish port of Ceyhan 
and a Turkish state-owned bank processed the transactions, these actions by KRG made 
Iraq government upset and directly cutting all payments to the Kurdistan region led the 
dispute between KRG and Baghdad to dangers stages. Furthers, but huge gas reserves of 
Kurdistan Region of country justifies Kurdistan is important more than Iraq for energy 
starving countries, outstandingly for Turkey and the EU.  
On the other hand, the main challenges to develop of Iraq petroleum industry are 
often from the Saddam Hussein era and the few years after the fall of Saddam. The 
problems are including geography like vulnerability of pipelines, oil price and terrorism 
78 
 
such as ISIS and other threats of corruption and economic mismanagement. The 
particular challenges and how governments have addressed them if at all.  
However, KRG may be unable to export gas via Iraq because of the 50 years 
agreement between Turkey and KRG. North and Middle Iraq, like Salahddin and Mosul, 
is best market for Kurdistan gas because all of Iraq’s gas is in South and the North and 
Middle is undeveloped for gas because of security issues. KRG should look where the 
best gas market is even find in Baghdad. More than 70 percent of gas production in 2013 
was flared due to a lack of sufficient infrastructure to utilize it for consumption. 
According to South Gas Company Director, “Basrah produces only around 1 billion 
cubic feet a day of associated gas and some 700 million cubic feet are being flared, which 
is wasting millions of dollars of the country’s resources every day”(Shell Global 2013). 
One interviewee, (Wahab 2016) claims KRG should cooperate with Iraqi central 
government to access international markets to sell its natural gas, because Iraq has control 
of an outlet to the Persian gulf, “Iraqi Kurdistan Region needs cooperation with Baghdad 
to access world markets through Basra port in South Iraq and so to secure the 
development of the gas industry through more investment in this sector (Wahab 2016)”. 
3.13 Summary 
Interview data suggests that internal political challenge are a major factor 
inhibiting Kurdistan’s gas development. First, Kurdistan’s dispute with Dana Gas 
Company, which is the only company invested in Kurdistan gas sector, is a major 
roadblock. The main dispute between KRG and Dana Gas on the details of contracts 
which is consider a big issue in front of KRG to increase the gas produce and fill they 
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needed. Second, the Iraq Constitution interpretation of article 11,112 is the center of 
many issues that affected this sector. Disputes over the management the oil and gas sector 
and over revenue sharing have been seen as a battle for sovereignty between Iraq and 
KRG. Third, Kurdistan’s landlocked geography is another issue with KRG depending on 
Turkey’s or Iran’s infrastructure for developing export markets, or in the future even 
potentially Syria’s. Overall, interviewees agreed that the gas sector will be essential to the 
sustainable development of the Kurdistan region’s economy in the future. But all the have 
the same feel that poor governance of the gas industry is a major factor inhibiting that 
development.
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CHAPTER IV 
GEOPOLITICS OF NATURAL GAS 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Since the Kurdistan government has begun to act as an independent actor in 
selling its oil and gas independent, these sectors have received substantial political and 
economic attention. The region’s estimated 708 billion cubic meters of proven gas 
reserves and 2.8–5.6 trillion cubic meters (unproven) of natural gas (Auzer 2016) are 
attractive for investors as well as countries seeking to diversity supplies and/or satisfy 
demand. In fact, if Kurdistan were an independent country, it would rank among the 10 
richest countries in terms of oil and gas reserves (Pflüger and Duero 2011). The 
Kurdistan Region has a reserve of 5.7 trillion cubic meters of natural gas which makes 
between 1.5% and 3% of the world’s reserve (Goran 2017). In case Kurdistan were to 
declare independence from Iraq, the dynamics of oil and gas production in the region 
would change quite dramatically. For example, Iraq would move from being the second 
largest OPEC producer of oil to third, replaced by Iran. According to statistics of 
production and reserves of oil and gas in Kurdistan, the region possesses more resources 
than five members of OPEC (Rascouet and AL Ansary 2017). The region has gone 
through several phases of exploration since the first well was drilled in 1901 in the Chia 
Surkh area, which was also the first well ever drilled in the Middle East (Mackertich and 
Samarrai 2015). Weakened by intra-party splits and corruption, the region’s institutions
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have become vulnerable to external interference. Turkey and Iran both have security and 
intelligence operatives active in the region and have a long history of meddling in 
Kurdish affairs. The United States of America, Russia, Turkey and Iran are trying in 
every way to establish a foothold in the region. The key players and actors shaping and 
influencing Kurdistan’s natural gas policy are energy firms, the region’s governments, 
and  other powerful state actors, such as neighboring countries. The roles of Turkey, Iran, 
and Russia in influencing the Kurdish gas policy are explained in this chapter. It answers 
the question of how these key actors affect the natural gas industry in Kurdistan. KRG is 
a non-state actor but it would like to increase its sovereignty by using its authority over 
the local hydrocarbon sector. Without sovereignty international actors will not cooperate 
without permission of central government in Baghdad. 
As this chapter shows, the fact that KRG lacks internationally recognized 
sovereignty makes it difficult for KRG to attract investment from international 
organizations to develop natural gas sector.  
The aim of this chapter is to explore how the energy policies of states beyond Iraq 
affect Kurdistan’s own energy policy. The influence of powerful neighboring states like 
Turkey, Iran, Russia and European Union are specifically considered. Understanding the 
role of outside states is crucial if scholars and KRG are to frame meaningful and long 
term policy initiatives. In this chapter I will answer the following research question: What 
is the potential role of Kurdistan’s natural gas supplies in the energy supply 
diversification of Turkey and Europe? 
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4.2 The Geopolitical of Kurdistan’s Natural Gas and Actors 
Geopolitics, as the expression of relationships among foreign policy, political 
power and the physical environment, has been considered to be a useful framework 
through which to examine energy security and policy making, particularly in thinking 
about how the location of energy resources and transportation issues impact interested 
states’ foreign policies (Agnew 2016). Most of the conventional scholarship on energy 
and geopolitics focuses on energy supply and energy security. Quantity and location of 
energy resources, more often than not, are viewed in geographically deterministic terms. 
A focus on geographical limits makes competition for energy resources, particularly oil, 
about competition for the control of geographies in which it is located or through which it 
is transported to consumers. While such an approach remains important among 
policymakers as well as some experts in the field of geopolitics, in the new era the 
definition of geopolitics has evolved to include such things as how states exert economic 
and political influence over a place in the context of the global economy.  
Understanding the geopolitics of gas is crucial to know what is going on the 
global market. And also know the present, past and future of the demand and supply. 
Mackinder demonstrated the close link between geopolitics and energy with his 
renowned Heartland theory, in which he argued that control over energy export routes of 
the Heartland helped to determine power over territory (Mackinder 1919).  
The geographic position of Kurdistan combined with its substantial energy 
resources gives it a significant role in the geopolitics o the Middle East. The clearest 
evidence of this comes in the attention paid to Kurdistan by large countries, for example 
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in the form of 42 consulate offices opened in Erbil by China, UK, German, Russia, India 
and others.  
Natural gas is one of the most important strategic industrial component due to its 
impact on economic development, growth, and imports. There are many gas pipeline 
plans in the Middle East and South Caucasus. Each plan has numerous political 
challenges and obstacles that may postpone progress on the projects. In 2011, gas 
demand in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) grew faster than in any other 
region in the world. It increased by almost 9 percent year on- year, reaching just under 
490 bcm (Darbouche 2012). 
Kurdistan today is essential to many proposals of natural gas pipelines in Middle 
East. Geopolitically, exporting Kurdistan natural gas would be in the interest of Turkey, 
Iraq, and Europe. developing Kurdistan natural gas could be beneficial for all the 
countries above but before this can happen there would need to be careful consideration 
of the corridors for exporting the gas. Knowing this the powerful energy actors in the 
region, such as Russia, Turkey, and Iraq, play a large role in influencing the development 
of Kurdish. The neighboring countries of Kurdistan can use various means, including 
price means, and the use of armed groups to threaten the stability of Kurdistan and to 
prevent Kurdistan from developing its gas sector. However, KRG looking forward by 
signed agreements with Turkey 50 years to export their gas and oil to Turkey and surplus 
to European countries. 
 KRG hopes Kurdistan will be a source of gas for Europe via Anatolian pipeline, 
but domestic natural gas needs and political disputes between Erbil and Baghdad have 
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dimmed those prospects. Given the complicated geopolitical situation of energy in the 
Middle East and South Caucasus, Kurdistan must balance its own interests with those of 
the powerful actors and suppliers of gas such as Turkey, Russia, Iran, and Iraq. If the 
government wants to develop a gas sector, it must participate in the global energy map 
with new projects from pipelines to transport gas from the region to the European and 
Asian markets such as the southern energy corridor. Over forty one companies are now 
investing in oil and gas fields in Kurdistan, and KRG has signed thirty seven contracts 
(Akreyi 2017). In 2011, the KRG offered medium companies and the five largest 
multinational energy companies incentives to come to Kurdistan to explore and invest in 
the petroleum sector. The presence of giant energy companies in Kurdistan such as 
ExxonMobil and Gazprom strengthens the argument of those in Kurdistan and abroad 
that do not want the independence Kurdistan. Geopolitical competition is occurring 
through pipelines projects in the area. Outside states aid pipeline projects for geostrategic 
reasons. At the current time, Kurdistan is at the mercy of the Turkish demands and the 
Kurdistan government must follow the political and economic positions of Turkey 
because the only port currently for the export of oil and gas of relevance to Kurdistan is 
in Turkey. Iran does not need Kurdistan’s gas and therefore is less interested in Kurdish 
gas development.  
4.3 Russia and Turkey’s Energy Relationship with Kurdistan 
The relationship between Russia and Turkey during the Syria civil war has 
changed dramatically. Turkey is as significant importer of Russia natural gas. Russia 
supplies about 53% of Turkey’s natural gas (Rzayeva 2018). Between them there are 
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many projects underway in the energy sector, including the “Turkish Stream” that carry 
out natural gas from Russia to Europe through Turkey.  
European countries want Turkey to be the hub for transporting gas from gas-rich 
countries of the Caspian Region such as Azerbaijan to Europe in order to increase supply 
diversity away from the dominance of Russia, which has controlled European markets for 
a long time. Turkey’s relationship with Russia around gas imports is part of a larger 
strategic relationship in which Turkey wishes to maintain leverage in order to maintain 
influence over Russia in the Syria crisis. Russia currently supplies Turkey with between 
60-70 % of its natural gas, and it charges high prices for it. Unsurprisingly, Russia’s own 
strategic calculation involves wanting to make sure this amount of gas export to Turkey 
does not change any time soon.  
Relations between Turkey and Russia have a major influence Kurdistan natural 
gas. Two big countries may agree to export 30 million cubic meters of Kurdish gas per 
year to Turkey in the future, but Russia wants to avoid a situation in which Kurdish gas 
surpasses Turkish demand and the oversupply is then exported to Europe. Russia would 
prefer to change Kurdistan transport path from Mediterranean Sea to Black sea according 
to Russia Ministry of energy (Ali 2017). It means Russia wants Kurdish gas to be used in 
local markets in Turkey and not exported to Europe because it will compete with Russia 
gas in the European market. Even though Kurdistan does have enough gas currently to 
send to Europe if Russia oversees the Kurdistan gas it may not allow exportation. For his 
part, Russia's special presidential representative to the Middle East, Alexander Sultanov, 
played down the impact of supplies from Iraqi Kurdistan and highlighted the 
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attractiveness of Russian gas supplies to Europe in the future (“The gas of Iraqi Kurdistan 
plays an important role in the Nabucco project” 2009). This may have been politically 
motivated because Russia views Kurdish gas in Europe as strategic threat. 
Turkey and Europe are the biggest export markets for Russian gas. Russia does 
not want new competitors of its market to appear in Europe. In fact, 80 percent of the gas 
that Russian state-controlled company Gazprom produces is sold to Europe, so 
maintaining this crucial market is very important (Chang 2015). 
Against this backdrop, it is interesting to witness how Mackinder’s theory has  
been resurrected by some political scientists in Russia such as Dugin, who wishes to 
revive the country’s historical dominant role in the region. By repairing Eurasianist 
thinking, these political scientists suggest that cultural and transportation integration will 
foster voluntary economic associations in the region. Recent visits to Erbil by Dugin are 
indicative of Russia’s efforts to exercise more influence over Kurdistan, especially by 
explicitly emphasizing the importance of Eurasia as a concept for Kurdistan’s bid for 
economic and political independence (“Russian Political Scientist Aleksandr Dugin on 
Kurdish Identity” 2017). 
Russian energy policy is the latest attempt to extend its influence in Kurdistan. 
Russian company Rosneft signed a B.O.O.T. (build, own, operate, and transfer) contract 
with Kurdistan for 20 years. It includes the processes of gas discovery and export of the 
Kurdish oil to its refinery in Germany and $ 1 million in advance for the Kurdistan 
government. This is part of a broader geopolitical strategy by Russia as shown by it 
paying a high premium to Turkmenistan just so that it will not export gas to Europe 
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(Rahim 2016). The last Russian attempts to influence the energy policy in Kurdistan 
involve the signing of an agreement between the KRG and the company Rosneft on the 
sidelines of the meetings of the Petersburg International Economic Forum. Rosneft and 
Kurdish Natural Resources ministry sign long-term contract (20) years on oil and gas for 
on widening their cooperation in exploration and production of hydrocarbons, commerce 
and logistics. The new agreements will allow talking about full entry of the company in 
one of the most promising regions of the developing global energy market with the 
expected recoverable reserves in the order of 45 billion bbl of oil and 5.66 trillion m3 of 
gas (“Rosneft and Iraqi Kurdistan Government Agree to Expand Strategic Cooperation” 
2017). But the agreement faced much criticism by the opposition party because it did not 
go through to the institutions of the Parliament of Kurdistan. Half of Rosneft Company 
belongs to the Russian government, which could mean the Russian government will have 
significant leverage over oil and gas sector in the Kurdistan in the future. However, the 
agreements between Rosneft and KRG have many positive aspectsas well, such as job 
creation opportunities for people in Kurdistan, and political support for KRG in its 
dispute with Baghdad. Also, it will be the first time KRG will sell its oil to a company 
directly rather than the commercial man in market.  
 Rosneft and KRG are planning to launch a pipeline to export gas to Turkey and 
Europe by 2020 expected to ensure gas exports of 30 billion cubic meters annually in 
addition to supplies to major domestic consumers and surplus to Turkey and Europe 
(Zhdannikov 2017b). That means Kurdistan will have ability to provide energy to 
Turkey. According to Rosneft it wants to help Kurdistan supply export markets with 6 
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percent of European total gas demand and one-sixth of current gas export volumes by 
Russia (Zhdannikov 2017b).  
Kurdistan’s main challenge is to find more options to export its gas if not to 
Turkey. Russia has increased support for PYD and YPG which are Kurdish parties in 
Syria. With increased Russian backing for PYD and YPG, it is safe to assume that 
Moscow will enable and facilitate the Kurds’ access to the Mediterranean. In that 
scenario, the Kurds need not acquire a coastal territory to access Latakia port; rather, 
Moscow can offer this access either through its own base in Latakia, or through 
facilitating a deal between Damascus and PYD. Syrian Kurds’ access to the 
Mediterranean will inevitably draw a wedge between KRG and Turkey in terms of 
exporting oil and gas.  
As mentioned above Russia’s relationship with Kurdistan has primarily been via 
FDI. Recently Russia has become involved in Kurdistan’s energy sector through its two 
biggest energy companies, Rosneft and Gazprom. But the competition between two 
companies on Kurdistan’s gas project will ensure that Russia is able to control one of the 
important potential sources of gas to Turkey and southeastern Europe. Russia appears to 
be targeting Kurdistan’s gas industry not to develop the resource but rather to control it 
so that it does not pose serious competition in Russia’s own export markets (Mills 
2018a). During the interview process a few interviewees mentioned the role of Russia in 
Kurdistan’s gas sector. On interviewee, Rahim, an energy expert said: 
 
Russia used all tactics and strategies to manipulate natural gas production in the 
world. For example Russia pays double the price to Turkmenistan to kill any 
commercial incentive of exporting gas to Europe. Russia is watching Kurdistan 
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gas closely and Russia could follow any of these strategies in the Kurdistan 
region. Russia would not allow Kurdistan to threat its gas monopoly in Turkish 
and European markets (Rahim 2016). 
 
 
In summary, KRG should not use its natural gas as a political tool in the market. 
The conflict between Russia, Turkey and European Union over gas is serious. KRG 
should not get involved in natural gas competition, especially with export countries such 
as Iran and Russia. In reality, based on the capability of KRG to develop its natural gas 
resources, they can compete with Russian gas in many aspects, the main one being the 
region’s favorable geographical location and generally positive relations with other 
countries. Thus the best option for Kurdistan is to treat gas as a commercial good that can 
be used for economic development, not as a political good that can be used to benefit the 
region’s political standing in the Middle East and beyond. Russia supplies Europe and 
Turkey about 75-90% of gas. In 2015, Russia exported 180 bcm to Europe. KRG must try 
to diversify the routes to export gas to countries in Asia like India, Pakistan and China, 
and other markets where Russia and Iran do not have a large presence. If KRG can 
present itself not as a competitor to those major exporters but rather as a producer that 
can supplement short supplies, it could strengthen its economy and become a more 
significant player in the increasingly global natural gas market. 
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Figure 13. Gazprom Blocks in Iraq-Kurdistan. Source: “Iraq” (2018) 
 
 
4.4 Turkey 
Turkey is gradually becoming an important natural gas and energy country, and is 
advantageously located as a transit country for oil and natural gas between suppliers in 
the Middle East such as Kurdistan, Iran, Russia, and consumers in the EU. With a rapidly 
growing economy and a population of 80 million people, Turkey has been one of the 
fastest growing energy consumers in the world (Austivk and Rzayeva 2017b). Located 
strategically between two continents, Turkey is also an important oil and gas transit 
destination. According to estimates from state-owned BOTAŞ (Boru Hatlarıile Petrol 
Taşıma A.Ş. BOTAŞ), demand for natural gas is projected to increase on average by 2.3 
percent/year from 2014 till 2030 implying that demand will grow from some 48 bcm in 
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2015 to 70 bcm by 2030, down from 80 bcm estimated by BOTAŞ in 2012 (Austivk and 
Rzayeva 2016). 
The relationship between Turkey and Kurdistan has developed in recent years. 
Turkey offers Kurdistan to access to be a pipeline that allows KRG to export more than 
600,000 barrels of crude oil per day. KRG could partially meet Turkey’s natural gas 
needs in the next few years and use the rest in domestic markets. Turkey’s own supplies 
of natural gas are mostly found in the eastern part of the country, in areas inhabited by 
Kurds, while most demand is in the more populated Western part of the country. There 
may be significant shale oil and gas reserves under the Aegean Sea, the Black Sea and in 
the Dadas shale in the South East of Turkey in Diyarbakir Province (“‘Turkey and the 
Geopolitics of Natural Gas’-Gulmira Rzayeva” 2017). In general the many gas pipelines 
through Turkey will play a crucial role for Turkey both in covering its own demand and 
becoming a transit hub (Emre and Kayaoglu 2016). Kurdistan’s gas would be the least 
expensive alternative for imports to Turkey. Tony Hayward, former head of Genel 
Energy and former executive director of BP, a company operating in the KRG, stated in a 
conference in November that the region has 5 trillion cubic meters of natural gas reserves 
- enough to meet Turkey's needs for 50 years (Lee 2015). 
The two huge gas fields in Kurdistan are Miran and Bina Bawi fields’ .The 
potential gas in the two fields around 8.4 trillion cubic feet (Genel Energy 2017). 
Turkey’s Genel Energy Company has signed Gas Lifting Agreements (‘GLAs’) 
agreements with KRG to supply Turkey around 10 billion cubic meters by 2020 (“Genel 
Eenrgy” 2017).  
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 One major obstacle to an energy relationship between Turkey and Kurdistan 
happened after September 5th, 2017, when KRG held referendum to be independent from 
Iraqi. The Turkish government threatened the KRG repeatedly because of the 
referendum. However, Turkey still needs Kurdistan’s gas especially for economic 
growth. Genel Energy has the potential to use Kurdistan’s largest gas fields to supply the 
industrial and merchant centers of South-Central Turkey around the ports of Mersin and 
Iskenderun and a string of cities from Antalya to Diyarbakir. Turkey would use Kurdish 
natural gas for its domestic use, but would also use it to feed theTANAP pipeline project. 
Indeed, when Turkey takes the risk of building an energy deal with the KRG, it is 
not only fighting for the transit of some thousands of barrels of oil, but also for the 
possibility of developing a second leg of the Southern Energy Corridor. 
The completion of the TANAP pipeline from Azerbaijan in 2018 will assist with 
diversification, but growing Turkish demand should require additional supplies. Genel 
plans to export up to 20 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year from Miran field, 
located some 300 km (186 miles) from Turkey (Reuters 2016, 1). Construction on this 
pipeline began in February 2016, with the aim of connecting Iraqi Kurdish gas with the 
Şırnak pipeline in the Kurdish-majority areas in northern Turkey (Tables 6-8). Also, 
Turkey will receive the cheapest price since it is the only outlet for exporting gas 
produced in Kurdistan. Kurdistan stands to become an alternative to Iran and Azerbaijan 
gas for Turkey. However, the United States during the Obama administration and other 
western allies did not want KRG act independently. This included skepticism about 
signing oil and gas deals without Baghdad’s permission, as such actions would increase 
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tensions between Arabs and Kurds. In Turkish political circles, there is a popular quip 
“the U.S wants Turkey and Iraq’s Kurds to become friends, not get married”, because 
America does not want Kurdistan to be separate from Iraq in order to encourage stability. 
American policy usually is to only work with central governments on official business. 
America has also ignored concerns of minorities rights when they are in tension with 
central governments. Turkey hopes for the best of both worlds: to be able to take 
advantage of Kurdistan’s natural resources without having an independent, sovereign 
Kurdistan that could present a problem in relation to Turkey’s own Kurdish population.  
The KRG should consider this when developing their partnership and diplomacy 
with Turkey. Interviews with political leaders within Kurdistan presented mixed opinions 
concerning Turkey. Officials from KRG suggested that Turkey’s impact on Kurdistan’s 
gas sector is positive. First, gas infrastructure in Turkey is well developed. Second, 
Turkey is the biggest gas consumer in region. Third, the location of Turkey as hub of 
many gas project proposals backed by the United States and European Union, which 
could enable Kurdistan to develop its natural gas sector. It is important to note that 
government personnel currently working in the Kurdish government belong to the two 
major parties, PUK and PDK. However, opposition party members view cooperation 
between KRG and Turkey differently than the ruling parties. Saad (2016), a PDK 
member and energy advisor to KRG, argued that the role of Turkish is positive. He said 
that Turkey allows KRG use of Turkish gas and oil pipelines which provides the KRG 
access to the international market. He stressed that without this access KRG would have 
no similar options to benefit from. Interviewee (Saad 2016) also commented, “Turkey is 
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very nice to us. We have agreements to use Turkey’s pipelines for 50 years. Where’s the 
bad? I’m not saying Turkey is innocent, politically but the agreement let’s Kurdistan 
reach the sea.” 
The infrastructure issue is critical for Kurdistan's exporting its gas due of high 
costs of establishing new gas pipelines to market. Turkey allowing KRG to use its 
pipelines is very helpful and is a sign that Turkey is willing to help KRG in this sector. 
Interviewee (Saad 2016) explains 
 
To develop Miran and Bini Bawi requires several billions of dollars not just 
50 hundred million. There is a huge field but at the same time you need 
infrastructure and pipelines to connect from the field to market, and its costs 
million dollars for per kilometer.  
 
 
Opposition argue that the KRG and Turkey’s energy relationship is negative because 
there is little transparency. For example, the KRG does not disclose details pertaining to 
the gas agreements with Turkey to parliament. On the other hand, there is evidence of 
increased transparency; for example, KRG signed an oil-audit agreement with audit 
company Deloitte in October 29, 2016 (Ala’Aldeen et al. 2018). 
A former member of Iraq’s parliament, member of the parliamentary oil and gas 
committee, and one of the member of the opposition party stated, “the 50 years 
agreement with Turkey supplies Turkey with cheap Kurdish gas that only supports the 
Erdogan and Barzani families, without any benefit to Kurds (Hassan 2016). 
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Table 6. Potential Turkish Genel Energy Production. Source: Short (2015) 
 
Field Reserve tcf Production/mcf 
Miran 4.3 Raw gas 400 
Bina Bawi 7.1 Raw gas  
  
 
Table 7. Kurdistan Gas Production and Turkish Gas Need. Source: “Door Organization 
for Petroleum Information of Kurdistan” (2014). 
 
Expect Kurdistan 
production/gas /cubic feet 
Turkish Consume daily 
cubic feet 
percentage 
2017 55,000,000 4,500,00,000 1,2 
2018 120,000,000 4,500,00,000 2,6 
2019 200,000,000 4,500,00,000 4,4 
 
 
Table 8. Turkey and KRG Gas Agreement Annually. Source: Short (2015). 
2018 2020 2025 
140 bcf 350 bcf 700 bcf 
 
 
4.5 Iran 
Iran has very large gas reserves and it could become a substantial global gas 
exporter now that sanctions have been lifted (Austivk and Rzayeva 2016). There is a plan 
in place to develop the Pars gas field by a government whose production will increase by 
about 172 million cubic meters per year to its current production of 210 million cubic 
meters annually (“Information about Iran | Business Etiquette in Iran” 2017). Iran is one 
of the world’s main holders of gas reserves, with 37 tcm of gas. Iran is the second largest 
producing of gas in the world. As such Iran does not need Kurdistan. Iran’s pipeline 
exports may increase, notably with the start of shipments to Iraq to Pakistan in 2017, but 
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LNG exports remain a distant prospect, especially if there are no changes to the political 
situation (Kinnander 2010). 
Kurdistan could join Iran in the future in many energy projects headed to Asian 
markets since some sanctions were lifted by the United States in 2016. According to 
Reuters, Kurdistan was in talks to potentially supply China with 4 million barrels of oil in 
2015 (Bousso, Saual, and Sheppard 2014). However, the biggest issue of Iran and KRG 
energy relationships progress is the Iraqi government. The Iraqi government complained 
that the KRG violated a constitutional provision, which emphasizes the right to central 
state to sell oil and gas solely within the powers and not give the powers to the regions, 
including Kurdistan to sell oil and gas independently. Iraq wants cut off this energy 
relationship between Iran and Kurdistan. Baghdad has accused the KDP and PUK of 
collecting 250 million a month from the benefits of the oil being exported to Tehran 
(Natali 2015). 
Geographically, KRG has 1200 km border with Iran. In the future, exporting 
natural gas to Iran via pipeline from KorMor, Chamchamal, and Kurdmir gas fields to 
Tabriz and Kermanshah in the North and Western Iran will be the best strategy for KRG 
since most of Iran’s gas reserves and infrastructure are located in the southern part of the 
country. This may satisfy Iran and benefit commercially, as well as Kurdistan may find 
another market in Asia for its gas, such as the markets of Pakistan and China.  
But at the same time, because Baghdad's relationship with Tehran is strong Iran 
would not bypass Baghdad to deal directly with Kurdistan. On the other hand, with 
continued uncertainties about the status of Iran sanctions and the nuclear deal and a 
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violent civil war in Syria, Turkey is the only workable exit for Kurdistan oil and gas. 
Kurdish gas could help TANAP by replacing Iranian gas contributions. Iran currently 
supplies the South Eastern of Turkey but has flow been interrupted in winter 2014 due to 
Iran’s own shortages. Also, Iranian gas is relatively expensive and Turkey wants to 
diversify its gas supplies so they are less depended on Russia and Iran. Turkey also buys 
9.6 billion cubic meters of gas from Iran on the basis of a contract that is valid until July 
2026.  
Iran with the help of the Iraqi central government is constantly applying pressure 
to the Kurdish Democratic Party to accept the extension of the pipeline to transport gas 
through Syria to reach the Mediterranean Sea as a substitute for existing routes from 
Kurdistan that pass through Turkey, especially with the end of the war on an Islamic state 
in Iraq and Syria (Figure 14). But the Democratic Party rejected this idea because of the 
existence of a gas contract between Kurdistan and Turkey for 50 years. 
The KRG can benefit in the future by using the planned infrastructure that will go 
through Iran to deliver natural gas to Asian energy markets. This would increase the 
possible number of markets. It could also build political and economic connections with 
Iran, an important and powerful regional force. For example Kurdistan could pay a 
transport fee to Iran for allowing the flow of gas. The Iran-Pakistan –IP-- gas corridor 
will be operational by 2018. Iran has completed 900 kilometers of the Iranian section of 
the pipeline. However, Asia is a large enough potential market that Kurdistan could 
supplement the natural gas Iran would supply.  
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Figure 14. Potential Route of Iranian oil to Mediterranean Sea. Source: Author. 
 
 
4.6 Europe, Turkey and Kurdistan Energy Relations 
Most of countries of the European Union have substantial demand for oil and 
natural gas because most of them lack sufficient energy sources. For East and Central 
Europe, Russia has been the main supplies natural gas and oil. The EU has been in favor 
of the diversification of natural gas imports since the gas crisis between Russia and 
Ukraine. The European Commission and Turkey has planned to build pipelines to import 
gas from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, with the Southern Corridor Project, which is 
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also a possibility in the future. The would open a door for Kurdistan to export its gas 
through those projects, such as Turkey-Greece-Italy pipeline (ITGI), the Trans-Adriatic 
Pipeline (TAP), the White Stream project and the TANAP Without Middle East 
resources. Kurdistan’s gas would be the best option for Europe to fill the TANAP pipe 
with 10 billion cubic meters yearly. In order to meet demand of European countries and 
Turkey many proposals like TANAP have been suggested to establish new pipelines 
projects like Southern Corridor, Anatolian pipelines, South Stream and Trans Adriatic 
pipeline. All of these would carry gas from the Middle East and Caspian Sea to 
international markets in Turkey and Europe. Kurdistan gas is at the heart of the new 
proposals. Kurdistan has been trying to utilize its energy resources to support and lead to 
its political independence and make a foundation for the development of its economy. 
Raising the international interest in Kurdish gas is driven by the policy of supply 
diversification. Turkish and Western energy companies have expressed their interest in 
the development and search of Kurdistan undeveloped prospective gas fields that would 
remarkably increase the potential gas volume of the region. That will help to meet some 
demand from Turkey, EU and other consumers. A report identified Iraq as a promising 
source of gas for the European Union, suggesting trade volumes in 2030 at 15 bcm (in a 
base case) and 30 bcm (“Although the Resources in the West May Be of Comparable 
Size the Main Potential” 2018). Northern Iraq is seen as the most likely initial source of 
gas, with a second phase potentially involving also associated gas from southern fields. 
The analysis shows that the delivered cost of pipeline gas exported to any of the regional 
markets, including markets in southeast Europe (assumed here as the western border of 
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Turkey with Bulgaria or Greece) would be well below the price assumed for these 
markets in 2020. 
Kurdistan could play a crucial role in ensuring stable gas supplies to Europe. 
Kurdistan’s gas is convenient for Europe because it is closer than other sources with the 
exception of Azerbaijan and Cyprus. It could help Europe diversify the sources of energy 
supplies. Kurdistan could supply 30% of gas needs in Europe. According to the plans of 
the Natural Resources Ministry, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) will produce 
a surplus of natural gas that will be exported abroad in the next three years, and sold to 
Europe (Hawrami 2016). Recently, Kurdistan PM met with the French Consul in the 
Kurdistan Region who emphasized that France and Europe in general are hoping the 
Kurdistan Region’s natural gas will fulfill a portion of their requirements,” Shaban noted. 
Annually, the KRG spends $3 billion generating electricity,” Shaban noted, adding that 
“There is a plan to use Kurdish local natural gas to produce electricity in the first stage 
and then in the next stage, the gas will be exported abroad. Israel has strongly backed 
Kurdistan as a stable proto-state on the other side of Arab rivals and bordering Iran. In 
general, the interconnection with Turkey, USA and Western countries is very important 
for Kurdistan energy produce from many phases. For instance, West can provide a pretty 
stable energy market likewise capital technology and administrative skills.  
Erbil considers Europe to be its main future market. Beginning natural gas 
pipeline trade with Europe is strategically important for many aims. Europe would be 
supporting Kurdistan towards independence and potentially even become part of NATO 
in the future to secure the defense of Kurdistan against its traditional enemies Iran and 
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Turkey. A well-paying market with substantial demands that, but also the possibility of 
turning Kurdistan into a transit country of key importance. However, KRG would look 
for other markets such as Syria in the future.  
4.7 The United States’ Role 
The United States has the ability to decrease Iranian and Russian leverage in 
Kurdistan and Iraq if it aids its strategic goals. The United States has many tools in order 
to exercise political influence in Kurdistan and Iraq; however, energy is the one with 
most potential. Energy cooperation between Kurdistan and Iraq is one approach that 
could potentially push away Iranian influence from Iraq and Kurdistan. A current 
example of how the United States is trying to exercise political influence is through its 
choice of export passage. The U.S. is trying to increase usage of the north-south energy 
corridor along with current usage of the Persian Gulf. Exporting Iraqi oil and gas through 
the north-south corridor would contribute to establishing Iraq an energy hub for Gulf 
States and Turkey, and possibly building an export bridge to Europe (Jeffrey and Knights 
2018). The corridor will likely be through the Iraqi-Syria and Iraqi-Jordan routes to the 
Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea (Jeffrey and Knights 2018). The corridor would also 
make use of Kurdistan’s locational assets because it is close to many pipeline projects 
within Iraq. For example, Kurdistan is close to most gas pipelines projects supported by 
the European Union, like the TANAP project. Also, there would be no third transit state 
in between joining Kurdish gas to TANAP. Kurdistan could become a transit for many 
routes carrying gas and oil from a region. Kurdistan has contracts with energy companies, 
including Exxon Mobil, Chevron, and Total.  
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4.8 Azerbaijan 
Azerbaijan is one of the world’s oldest oil-producing countries. It is situated in the 
South Caspian Sea basin. Azerbaijan’s economy has depended heavily on its huge deep-
water, offshore oil and gas resources in the Caspian Sea (“Azerbaijan” 2017). British 
Petroleum (“BP Statistical Review of World Energy” 2016) estimated Azerbaijan’s crude 
oil and natural gas reserves at the end of 2014 to be 7.0 billion barrels and 1.2 trillion m3, 
respectively. Crude oil exports account for 93% of total merchandise exports 
(“Azerbaijan” 2015). In Azerbaijan, the fiscal regime is a contractual system. Under 
production sharing agreements (PSAs), Azerbaijan countenances IOCs to invest in the oil 
and gas sector. The current fiscal regime of the country’s petroleum sector is based on 
PSAs. At present, the major natural gas customers are Turkey and Greece (“Azerbaijan” 
2017). Kurdistan could replicate the Azerbaijan model by exporting gas to Turkey and 
South Eastern Europe by 2020 according to agreement with Rosneft (Zhdannikov 2017b). 
But the Turkish market is priority of Kurdistan gas after the surplus will going to the 
South East of Europe. The bulk of Kurdish gas will be available just in small scale 
markets. KRG and Azerbaijan will participate to fill out the pipelines going to Europe 
and Turkey. Azerbaijan and Kurdistan gas will be a good supporter to Turkish and South 
east European market but with different proportions of gas. The competition between 
Kurdistan and Azerbaijan gas will be in price and how to most efficiently transport gas to 
Turkey and Europe. Producing gas offshore, as in the case of Azerbaijan, is more 
expensive than producing onshore gas. On the other hand, because of the cultural 
similarities between Turkey and Azerbaijan there are not the same potentials for conflict 
103 
 
between the two countries as there may be between Turkey and Kurdistan. Azerbaijan is 
Turkey’s only gas supplier that has not been subject to a serious price conflict with 
BOTAŞ or to other geopolitical tensions (Austivk and Rzayeva 2017b). One reason that 
Turkey may not want to extend the contract with Azerbaijan is the possible emergence of 
cheaper gas from KRG at some point in the period to 2020 (Austivk and Rzayeva 2016). 
Because of the proximity of Kurdistan gas, growing demand in Turkey, and appropriate 
price the Turkish market looks to be the most commercially feasible. Moreover, the 
estimate volumes of Kurdistan gas reserve 5.7 trillion cubic meters exceed those of 
Azerbaijan by around four times if the estimates are accurate (D. O. Okumuş 2013). (See 
Figure 15). 
The likelihood of new gas transportation capacity across Turkey to accommodate 
export volumes from Azerbaijan offers an opportunity for tie-ins from Kurdistan, and the 
possible extension of these pipeline routes into South East Europe provides an opening 
for KRG to become a supplier to European gas markets, which are projected to require 
almost 200 bcm in additional gas imports as demand rises and indigenous production 
falls. Finally, this consistent amount of natural gas Kurdistan could satisfy its domestic 
consumption and export surplus gas to Turkey and Europe.  
After Azerbaijan become independent from Soviet United in 1991, the former 
president Aliyev made a decision not to establish new pipelines to only Westerns 
countries (Mansurbeg 2016). Aliyev considered the proposal by law makers of 
Azerbaijan to only Western countries to be a provocations toward Russia. Aliyev said 
new pipelines projects should instead include routes to both Russia and Europe. The gas 
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policy of Azerbaijan has been working till today which satisfied both Russia and Turkey. 
The next section explores the similarities and differences between Kurdistan and 
Azerbaijan in term of energy policy. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Iraq, Azerbaijan and Kurdistan Gas Reserves in bcm. Source: Author, based 
on Roberts (2016). 
 
 
4.9 Energy Policy: Comparing Azerbaijan and KRG 
Natural resources have been politicized as a substantial tool for generating 
political power and to protect security. The world’s natural gas reserves are estimated at 
6,879 trillion cubic feet.  Kurdistan accounts for 43.7 billion barrels of proven oil 
reserves, 25.5 billion more barrels of unproven reserves, and 5.7 trillion cubic meters of 
gas (30% of Iraq's proven oil reserves). If Kurdistan was a recognized country, the 
amount of oil and gas reserves would place it among the top 10 oil rich countries in the 
world 2013 (“Active Oil Companies in Iraqi Kurdistan” 2013).  
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Kurdistan has emerged as an attractive point for foreign investments (Akreyi 
2017). Several multi-national companies in different place across the world poured to 
Kurdistan. In 2017, by signing the agreement with Rosneft, KRG has 53 sharing contracts 
with 28 companies in 27 different states operating in Kurdistan (Akreyi 2017). Turkey 
and the European Union have a strong interest in building pipelines and providing an 
alternative source of gas for Turkey and Western Europe. KRG has also been covertly 
building energy relationships with Israel and European countries with the intention of 
strengthening Kurdistan’s geopolitical position in the region.  
Kurdistan’s relations with Turkey and the European Union are similar to that of 
Azerbaijan, with a key difference being the sovereign status of each. While Kurdistan’s 
semi-independent status has given it some appeal from other major players in the region, 
such as Turkey and Iran, its lack of independence prevents it from fully benefiting from 
relations with other countries. The political and economic systems of Kurdistan and 
Azerbaijan are also similar. Finally, both increased their level of independence in the 
early 1990s.  
After gaining independence, Azerbaijan established its own oil and gas company 
known as SOCAR. There is currently support in Kurdistan from both the population and 
parliament to establish its own oil company for the purposes of resource exploration and 
marketing. 
Upon establishing SOCAR the first duties of the president were to encourage 
production and trade in energy resources. Aliyev, the sitting Azerbaijani president in 
1992, implemented strategies to welcome neighbors and international powers such as 
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Russia, the United States, and Iran (Svyatets 2013). Conversely Kurdistan possesses more 
natural gas wealth than Azerbaijan did in the 1990s. Kurdistan’s current reserves of 
natural gas are estimated at 5.7 trillion cubic meters (“Active Oil Companies in Iraqi 
Kurdistan” 2013). 
Kurdistan has struggled against the Iraqi Central Government to maintain the 
partial sovereignty in gained in 1992. Similarly, Azerbaijan worked to protect its 
sovereignty from powerful neighboring states like Turkey, Iran, and Russia. (Mehdiyeva 
2011) presents four options for newly sovereign states, but the first option is most 
applicable to Kurdistan’s current goal. It includes alliance-building and strategic 
maneuvering. When faced with a similar situation Azerbaijan also utilized the alliance-
building option in developing energy policy. Azerbaijan has placed energy security at the 
center of its political strategy and has used its resource wealth toward national benefit.   
 Kurdistan has attempted to use its gas and oil wealth in a similar manner. 
Specifically, Kurdistan has attempted to leverage its natural resources to establish 
relationships with neighbors. Proper handling of its natural resources could potentially 
mitigate the strength of powerful neighboring countries. KRG should look to Azerbaijan 
as an example of how to participate with multiple routes because the two are very similar 
in terms of neighbors, dependency on soft power, and both need diversity of supply 
routes. Both Azerbaijan and Kurdistan have similar reserves of oil (Mills 2018a). 
The key lesson Kurdistan stands to learn from Azerbaijan’s resource policy is 
flexibility to meet demands from multiple actors. Former Azerbaijan president Aliyev  
approached the link between national interest and foreign relations carefully. He 
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undertook efforts to protect energy relationships with multiple energy companies thereby 
not relying too much on any one company. Azerbaijan government clearly communicated 
that relationships with energy companies from competing countries was welcomed. 
Ayliff instructed his cabinet to propose strategies that required satisfying both Russia and 
Western countries, predicting extending relations to only one could cause provocation 
(Mansurbeg 2016). The possibility of provocation was especially a concern with Russia 
as Azerbaijan was formerly part of the former Soviet Union. 
 Kurdistan could implement a similar strategy in dealing with companies and take 
effort to not ignore or alienate potential partners. KRG have agreements with Turkey, but 
the KRG should also have the similar agreements for example with Iran if possible.  
The United States has tried to urge Baghdad and Erbil to select the Turkish route 
exclusively. Similarly, the US urged Azerbaijan to build relations (and pipeline) with 
Georgia instead of Iran and Russia. This was an effort to minimize Iran and Russia’s role 
in energy transport. Russia sees such efforts in “the near abroad” and Middle East as a 
blatant attempt to more undermine Russia interest and delay the renewal of its Great 
Power position (Yergin 2011). In response, the Russian oil company Rosneft has 
increased its investment and presence in Kurdistan. For example their last agreement with 
the KRG they plan to spend 4 million dollars in Kurdistan gas and oil sector over next 
two years (Zhdannikov 2017b). 
Dependency on a single consumer could be a strategic failure. Doing so would 
fail to aid Kurdistan in acquiring new allies in region. Azerbaijan has avoided 
dependency on a single consumer or a single pipeline. KRG has many potential 
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consumers if they want to extend energy relations. Potential future customers include 
Italy, Russia, Israel, Spain, German, Croatia and Latvia. In 2017, Kurdistan signed a 
substantial deal with Rosneft Company for natural gas exploration and exportation. This 
raised concerns in Iraq, Turkey, and the West. KRG stated the deal came through only 
because Rosneft had offered a $1 billion advance to KRG (Chmaytelli 2017). Kurdistan 
has shown Turkey that it is not the only potential customer for Kurdistan’s natural gas. 
This could increase rivalry among consumers and, as a result, increase the importance of 
Kurdistan. For instance, Russian showed support for Kurdistan in its dispute with 
Baghdad and Ankara concerning the recent referendum. 
Kurdistan could potentially turn its gas from TANAP to pro-Russia and pro-Iran 
projects. One US concerned issue that remains unsolved is Iraq’s energy cooperation with 
KRG. Conflict between Erbil and Baghdad over dispute areas (Articles 140) remains a 
big obstacle for energy development. The U.S. has been unwilling to solve the issue and 
Kurdistan has not received as much support from the United States as expected.  
Nevertheless, the conflict between Erbil and Baghdad was one of the main reasons why 
KRG chose to plan gas pipeline routes Turkey and Russia instead of south Iraq’s port.  
Erbil and Baghdad tension are similar to like Azerbaijan-Armenia tensions in 
Nagorno-Karabakh. The Nagorno-Karabakh dispute is the reason why Azerbaijan and the 
Western allies elected to use BTC route though Georgia instead of going through 
Armenia. Physical security of resource transport is the motivation for Azerbaijan 
choosing the BTC and Kurdistan’s choosing of planning gas pipeline to Russian and 
Turkey.   
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Even existing pipelines are often non-operational during because of attacks on 
infrastructure from PKK in Turkish territory. The geopolitical maneuvering by Kurdistan 
attempting to balance relations with United States, Russia, Iraq, and Turkey, help 
Kurdistan’s goals of establishing energy export decision-making and independence.  
Economic factors can only partially explain why Turkey and Russia is so 
interested in Kurdistan. KRG has been friendly with Turkey, U.S. and Western investors. 
Kurdistan and Turkey have tightly cooperated in gas trade and investment for almost a 
decade. Turkey is the leading state in the gas trade and its government has not stopped 
the flow of oil from Kurdistan in favor of other oil and gas sources in Middle Eastern or 
Caspian region. Turkey continues to ignore criticism concerning Turkish-Kurdish relation 
Iraq’s central government.  
The European Union’s desire to reduce Russia’s dominance of the European and 
global natural gas markets is important for Kurdistan’s gas industry. But the LNG and 
conventional gas revolution in the US and Europe may affect the significance of Kurdish 
gas in Europe. However, LNG imports to Europe were in fact lower by 3.3 per cent in 
2016 due to a number of problems at new LNG projects, including commissioning 
problems, feed gas supply issues and structure slippage linked to go up costs, with the 
result that total LNG supply has not increased as fast as predicted (Henderson and 
Sharples 2018). (See figure 16). 
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Figure 16. European Gas Imports and Demand, 2010 – 2017. Source: Henderson 
and Sharples (2018). 
 
 
The United States strongly supports Baku. US support is a major factor in 
determining the selection of pipeline routes and how deal politically with gas policy with 
other states. The Azerbaijan case provides several lessons that can be applied in 
Kurdistan, such as geopolitical vying being the main obstacle to mutually profitable 
energy deals. This case illustrates that it is important to take into account the issue-
linkage between energy negotiations and geopolitical competitions. Conflicts between 
governments can negatively influence the outcome of energy talks, such as those between 
the United States and Russia, Turkey and Iran. However, there are also key differences 
between Kurdistan and Azerbaijan regarding energy policy. First, Kurdistan’s status as an 
oil and gas producing region goes back to the 2007 while Azerbaijan's production goes 
back to the mid-19th century. This distinction is significant because it is related to 
differences in diplomatic experience, specifically experience in dealing with resources 
and outside influences. Also, Azerbaijan was part of the Soviet Union, which was 
consider one of the most powerful states in the world in term of economics and politics at 
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the time. Second, Azerbaijan was the biggest oil producer in the world, providing half of 
the world's oil output during the pre-WWII period. At that time Azerbaijan produced 75 
percent of the overall Soviet oil output (Svyatets 2013). Kurdistan’s gas reserves are like 
Azerbaijan’s. 
Both Kurdistan and Azerbaijan have problems with strength of democratic 
institutions. For example, the Barzani and Talabani families in Kurdistan and Aliyev 
family in Azerbaijan have had disproportionate power for long periods. Civic freedoms 
and the lack of democratic institutions have not prevented relationships with Turkey, 
European countries and the United states. Azerbaijan and the United States have 
overcome all these serious obstacles and created a close energy and military partnership. 
Hence, you can observe a major difference between the policies of two systems. 
Azerbaijan has been able to keep close relations with the United States and Iran at the 
same time but Kurdistan has been unsuccessful in balancing relations. For example, 
ethnically the Azeri community comprises 26% of the population of Iran (Souleimanov, 
Pikal, and Kraus 2013). Even though the Kurdish population makes up 15% of Iran’s 
population, this has not translated into similarly good relations. The KRG has focused 
more on Turkish relations.  
KRG should seek positive collaboration with Iran via establishment of new gas 
pipeline through Iranian territories and pay to Iranian transit fee. This would promote 
cooperation from Iran in other aspects of KRG foreign dealings like with Europe and 
Turkey. KRG should not to rely on a single route as it would limit flexibility. KRG 
calculating the cost and benefit of the trade and also evaluate geostrategic and 
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geopolitical outcomes of new partner and markets. For instance, Asia is a potential 
market that Kurdistan could export its natural gas into. The KRG can benefit from the 
existing infrastructure through Iran to transport natural gas to Asia. Federal Minister of 
Petroleum has said that the Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline and TAPI gas pipeline will be 
completed in 2018 and 2020, respectively (The Express Tribune 2016). If not, the IP 
pipeline will pose a direct challenge to Washington’s sanctions. The United States has 
continuously threatened Pakistan with economic sanctions if Islamabad goes ahead with 
the IP pipeline project. The Kurdistan government has tried to develop new energy 
relations and policy to attract companies to Kurdistan, however the recently failed 
referendum has provoke anger from neighbors and the disappointment of major countries 
like America. This has negatively impacted on all sectors of life in Kurdistan, including 
the energy sector.   
4.10 TANAP 
TANAP is a new gas pipeline project intended to export gas form Azerbaijan and 
Middle Eastern countries to the Turkish-Greek border, across Greece, Albania and the 
Adriatic Sea before reaching Italy. TANAP is currently under construction and projected 
to export six billion cubic meters of gas to Georgia and Turkey by late 2018. The gas 
pipeline which is to be a base in Azerbaijan announced in 2013. They will carry out 
natural gas from Caspian Sea and Shah Deniz II to the European Union through Turkey. 
The supplies of Azerbaijani gas resources will account for only around 2% of EU gas 
demand and consequently will not diversify the market significantly (Kardaś 2014). Gas 
imports from Azerbaijan may only be helpful in diversification of gas sources for Greece 
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and Bulgaria, which are overly dependent on Russian gas and are geographically closer to 
Azerbaijan (Kardaś 2014). The purpose of TANAP is not solely to carry gas from Shah 
Deniz II but to export potential gas for Middle Eastern and Central Asian sources as well. 
Turkey wants to be an energy hub in the region. For now, Turkey is looking to enhance 
and satisfy its own developing natural gas demands. Kurdistan with natural gas reserve of 
5.7 tcm it will be one of the potential suppliers to this pipeline in 2020 and plans to fill 10 
bcm annually. Turkey already began building a pipeline from Mardin to Kurdistan border 
under BOTAS contract (Balat and Ozdemir 2006). Kurdistan oil pipelines currently 
transport 550 barrels/day to Turkish port Ceyhan. Shah Deniz II gas field may participate 
in this new pipeline and as all Azeri’s gas appraisal be 2-3.5 trillion cubic feet (tcf) which 
means Azerbaijan does not have sufficient gas to fill out the TANAP pipeline. This is an 
opportunity for Kurdish gas to find the new buyers in Europe. Due the closest point of 
Kurdistan from TANAP being only 570 km away, it would be easy for KRG to link up 
with this gas pipeline. Kurdistan would needs a pipe extension from the city of Zakho to 
Erzurum in Turkey. (See figure 17).  
Like Azerbaijan, KRG wants to establish new gas pipelines. KRG should 
establish new pipelines from Kurdistan through Iran to sell their gas to Asia market like 
India and Pakistan which gave Iran transit fee and also dragging Iran to KRG circle 
economic interest. On other hand, security issues are one of the most significant factors 
that has affected pipelines development Kurdistan wants to export gas from the Caspian 
Sea to Southeast Europe and Turkey. The Kurdistan Workers' Party — considered a 
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terrorist group by most of the international community attacked the lines in Eastern 
Turkey that bring Azerbaijani and Iranian natural gas to Turkey (Roberts 2016). 
Kurdish leaders believe that because the region is landlocked, they must consider 
relations with neighbors and transit countries as significant factors in its gas export 
strategies. Turkey has been the most important energy partner of gas export to Europe. 
Iran and Iraq are the preferred partner for future access to Southeast Asia’s markets. 
The clear connections and challenges of transit issues can be seen in KRG energy 
policy decision to make Turkey its key transit country. KRG has provided Turkey with 
subsidized prices. And both states share common security concern about ISIS and PKK.  
Establishing energy independence from Russia natural gas imports was also a 
strong motivation for Ankara to diversify its hydrocarbon imports with Kurdistan gas. 
This desire grew after weakening of relations with Moscow concluded in the Turkey -
Russia conflict of Syria war. Another, important factor for Turkey was that Kurdistan 
sells its gas for lower prices than Russia. Moreover, Turkey receives natural gas and oil 
as a transit fee in exchange for being the key transit country for Kurdistan hydrocarbon 
resources. There is currently an active agreement between Turkey and the Kurdistan 
Regional Government that was signed in 2013 for 50 years to supply Turkey with gas and 
at a cheap price: for per 1,000 cubic meters Turkey will pay $150 (Roberts 2016). 
However, Iran is optimistic about Kurdistan gas resources. Even though Iran has 
second largest natural gas reserves in the world, its increasing production can barely keep 
pace with domestic consumption. Lacking foreign investment, Iran’s domestic 
investment in its gas pipeline infrastructure is insufficient because of its high 
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subsidization of domest1ic consumption. This is because the infrastructure based on 
domestic resources does not cover all parts of the country (Jalilvand 2013). 
There has been a tense political relationship between the Iran and Kurdistan. One 
source of tension was Kurdistan’s decision to hold a referendum on self-determination. 
This could encourage Kurds in Iran to do the same (Jalabi 2017). Another source of 
tension is associated with the relationships between Iraq and Iran and sectarian religious 
conflict. Despite existing conflicts between Kurdistan and Iran, Iran still needs 
Kurdistan’s gas because of Iran’s gas fields are located in the far south of the country, 
meaning that it would need to extend a pipeline from South to North at great expense. For 
this reason, Kurdistan is closer to Iran in terms of distance from all other places exporting 
gas. 
In the future, Kurdistan as a transit region must be addressed especially if will 
happened unity between west Kurdistan and south Kurdistan. More interesting for KRG 
is that Europeans have a planned to import gas from the Qatar and Iran. This plan 
requires Kurdistan to function as a transit region for gas originating from the Persian Gulf 
and Asia and traveling to the Western markets. Kurdistan’s position as a key transit 
region for future Western Asian energy trade has been considered a strategic asset by not 
only policy makers but also by USA and European countries. Kurdistan would be the 
only region that can provide transport routes for Iranian and Qatari natural gas to the 
West without passing through Turkey. As well as another thing that Iran fears of the 
relationships between Kurdistan and Turkey because of religion with Sunni being the 
dominant sect in both places. 
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Figure 17. Kurdistan’s Potential Gas Pipeline to Access TANAP. Source: Author, 
based on PressTV (2015). 
 
 
4.11 Energy Security 
Energy security has become a broadly discussed topic today in many disciplines 
related to international relations (Abdulrahman and Sebastine 2013). The current 
geopolitical developments in the world have prompted countries to discuss the energy 
plan in their foreign plans seriously. The geopolitics of energy is shaped by geographical 
location and the role that relative location plays in terms of transit, supply and demand 
for energy (Austivk and Rzayeva 2017b). Energy geopolitics involves location, volumes 
of natural resources, who controls them, how available they are, the prices, alternative 
transportation routes political decisions. But, modern geopolitics became concerned with 
the political discourse among international actors resulting from all factors that determine 
the political and economic importance of a country's geographic location. “Relative gains 
matter, but so (also) joint gains from possible cooperation” (Victor, Jaffe, and Hayes 
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2006). Geographical location and role for supply, demand or transit for energy is defined 
geopolitics of energy for any region or country (Austivk and Rzayeva 2017b). Energy 
geopolitics of any region must be understood by both the size and location of own and 
other natural resources, how available they are, who controls them, their cost, alternative 
transportation routes, how regional and global markets balance, market mechanisms and 
regulations, political decisions, and prices in general (Austivk and Rzayeva 2017b). 
Despite ongoing discussions about the exact size of Kurdistan gas reserves, the region has 
undoubtedly significant gas resources. The Kurdistan region’s giant natural gas field has 
made the region a potential key player in global energy security (Dickel et al. 2014).  
Natural gas will remain a resource of strategic and political importance. According to 
scholars the meaning of energy security concepts vary widely. As Johnson and Boersma 
defined energy security in both the United States and the EU is: (1) ‘availability’ or do 
we have enough when we want it (2) affordability’, at the right price; (3) ‘efficiency’, can 
we use less and get the same output; (4) ‘sustainability’, are we irreparably harming the 
environment through energy production and use (Johnson and Boersma 2013). 
Depending on these basic concepts of energy security Kurdistan could participate in 
domestic and forging energy security. The Kurdistan region’s natural gas production 
could be a possible future source of diversification of EU’s natural gas supply through the 
Southern Gas Corridor, which aims to decrease European dependence on Russian gas 
(Auzer 2016). Kurdistan is now at the top of the list of potential supply sources (Chyong, 
Slavkova, and Tcherneva 2015). They offer incentives to foreign oil companies to invest 
in the Kurdistan oil and gas sector. Kurdistan could play a big role in term of suppling 
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Europe with natural gas if the conflicts between Baghdad and Erbil over revenues 
sharing, export strategy and disputed territories are organized out. 
Even in term of traditional theories, Kurdistan‘s position matches with much of 
Mackinder’s pivot area and Spykman heartland theories that emphasizes on the 
importance of location in Central Asia and the Middle East. Kurdistan could a play a 
crucial role in Middle East’s energy strategy. Kurdistan will enhance Western, 
particularly European, energy security because the pipelines across Turkey avoid Russia 
and Iran. The ultimate result of the implementation of these alternative routes is that 
Russia’s potential as a regional hegemon on the Eurasian continent is diminished 
(Efferink 2015).   
In the future, Kurdistan can have an influence Turkey's position towards the 
Kurdish issue by supplying it with gas, according to former chief executive of oil and 
energy company BP in Atlantic summit in Istanbul (Short 2015). However, being 
landlocked may affect ability to archive all categories that define energy security. But a 
situation of instability in the region will put the energy policy of Kurdistan at risk. At the 
same time, how to draw up an energy policy that does not conflict with exporting 
countries is very important. The best option of KRG if they want escape the Russia 
pressures and they show up as not compete Russia and Iran gas in the big market in 
Europe. Politically, it would be good for Kurdistan to bring an Asian energy company to 
Kurdistan from places such as India, Iran, Pakistan or China, because this would enhance 
Kurdistan’s position and lead to more likely prospects of independence. 
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Kurdistan’s natural gas could significantly improve the economic and human 
condition and contribute to the development and security natural gas to Turkey and even 
Europe. The implications for Kurdistan’s gas balance are as follows. Of the gas produced 
in 2020, up to 20 bcm (6.6 bcm to Turkey under its Miran contract, 10 bcm to KorMor 
counterparties and 2.2 bcm to Iran) could be under contract for export, leaving 8.4-11.9 
bcm for domestic consumption (Roberts 2016). KRG forecasts 11.8 bcm of domestic 
consumption in 2020, 25 and would presumably have to make up any shortfall (up to 3.4 
bcm) with Russian imports (Katona 2017). If the Kurdistan gas become ready to export 
would impact Russia export gas to Turkey. KRG and Turkey have signed agreements for 
Kurdistan to export 10 bcm /year to Turkey from 2018, but there are insufficient 
compressor stations for transport of gas to areas of consumption (Rzayeva 2018).   
4.12 Security Issues 
Energy security today and in the future is among the most serious security and 
economic challenges. Many terrorist groups have targeted gas and oil facilities and 
storage, and pipelines. They are behind the attacks of gas and oil infrastructures seeking 
to destabilize the internal and external affairs of states in the Middle East and North 
Africa. The energy infrastructures have been exposed to growing terrorist threat which 
ties with growing political and economy instability in gas and oil producing regions. 
According to Tyagi (2016) in 2003 and 2007 increased attacks targeting energy oil and 
gas infrastructures nearly 40% of the world energy and its transportation. Nevertheless, a 
combination of a relatively stable security situation, investor-friendly policies and the 
allure of unexplored energy reserves have attracted an increasing number of oil 
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companies, including the world's largest, Exxon Mobil, which last year signed a 
landmark deal with Kurdish officials (Akreyi 2017). The KRG and the Kurdistan political 
leadership came to an inference that only strong security can fence the future 
development of Kurdistan in all fields. Therefore, what have been carried out in terms of 
stability and security paved the way for many to interest from Kurdistan as a region for 
business opportunities.  
The situation is still quite fluid. Bagdad and Kurdish authorities still have 
disagreements on hydrocarbon policy, and the relationships between political actors 
involving the Syria civil and others such as Militia groups and parties have been a 
problem for KRG. Thus, security has a great role in decreasing development levels of the 
KR after 2014, when ISIS attacked Kurdistan and captured significant territory. KRG 
faces many complicated issues which has pushed interested companies to re-think 
investment in the energy and natural gas. The security issues associated with the influx of 
refugees to Kurdistan makes the natural gas security progress slower in terms of 
development and exportation to the international markets. These issues have lead some 
companies to step back from investment in the upstream and mid-stream business, 
including the recent withdrawal from the Kurdistan’s big oil blocks by ExxonMobil, 
Shell and Chevron energy companies from the Betwata and Chwarta oil fields and the 
Rovea and Shekhan (Figure 18).  
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Figure 18. Exxon Mobil Blocks Withdraw in Kurdistan. Source: Abdullah (2016); 
“ExxonMobil Withdraw from Kurdistan” (2017). 
 
 
The Syrian civil war has had direct and indirect influences on KRG oil and gas 
policy. Russia’s and Iran’s motivations for not wanting to remove Assad from power and 
getting involved in the Syria war are at least in part related to questions over the future of 
natural gas supplies and markets (Chang 2015). Iran and Qatar have plans to establish 
new gas pipelines to export gas via Saudi Arabia and Syria to Europe (Chang 2015).  
Turkey and KRG fear the PKK because both cannot solve the security problem 
alone. This why Barzani and Erdoğan presently want to continue peace talks with PKK. 
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For this purpose, the president of the Kurdistan Region visited the Turkish city of 
Diyarbakir on 2013, indicating Turkey’s wish to further build its relations with Iraqi 
Kurdistan. In addition, Erdogan wants to exploit the influence over Barzani to gain the 
favor of Kurds in Turkey in order to put down any rebellion and involve them in the 
political process.  
Russia has played a clear role supporting the PKK and its military-backed groups. 
Russia uses the PKK as a weapon against Turkey, which creates a situation of instability, 
especially in the areas that pass gas pipelines that transport gas Azerbaijan from the 
region of Erzurum which has a Kurdish majority. Furthermore, the question rising which 
is as long as Turkish faces the security issue, they will be able to guarantee security for 
the pipeline in the face of what would seem to be nonstop threats by PKK and pro- PKK 
elements in Turkey to attack gas infrastructure. From Turkey’s ruling AK party’s 
perspective, a rapprochement with Iraq’s Kurds could guarantee at least some of Iraq’s 
oil flowing to Turkey, and enlist KRG’s support for the Turkish peace process with its 
Kurds. Turkey is an important player and influencer of Iraq’s energy industry, as an 
importer of, and as transit country for Kurdistan’s oil and gas.  
KRG could confront security issues by using Trans Anatolian pipeline (TANAP) 
and the Trans Adriatic pipeline (TAP) to export its gas to international markets. The two 
important pipelines, Baku-Tbilisi- Erzurum and The Kirkuk-Ceyhan Turkish oil pipeline, 
are for transporting gas and oil from Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. Both pass through the 
Kurdish areas inside Turkey and have been attacked by the PKK and pro-PKK force. One 
resolve to Turkey is the peace talk continues between Turkey and PKK lead to guarantee 
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of energy security. On the other hand, after Turkey took measures against Kurdistan in 
response to the Kurdish referendum, including political and economic sanctions, such 
actions could backfire for Turkey by weakening Barzani while empowering the Kurdistan 
Workers Party (PKK). Boosted by the Kurdish autonomy drive in northern Syria and its 
defense of Sinjar’s Yazidis against the Islamic State (IS), the PKK stands a chance of 
gaining a greater foothold in Iraqi Kurdistan. At all, KRG is in control of the security 
situation despite the limited human and material resources. Actually, without stability and 
security in the KRG it would have been very difficult to launch and develop the gas 
industry. However, the KRG recognized that any future step for exploiting and exporting 
gas abroad cannot be succeeded easily without Turkey Iran and Iraq cooperation.  
4.12.1 ISIS and Militias Groups: 
The most significant challenge facing the energy sector is security. Terrorist 
organizations have always been interested in targeting oil and gas facilities. There are 
many armed groups in Iraq under the different ideological and religion authority that do 
not adhere to the rule of law. There are Shiite and Sunni extremist groups. The Islamic 
state of Syria and Iraq is a terrorist group as known ISIS or ISEL, it collects large sums of 
money by assaulting gas and oil facilities. According to Iraqi forces, oil and gas facilities 
have been attacked 500 times between 2003 and 2008. ISIS also attacked Kurdistan in 
June 2014 though it was later liberated. ISIS militants seized some oil and gas fields near 
the Kirkuk province like Khabbaz and Bai Hassan fields. According to Iraq security 
agency data, while they were in charge they sold oil by tankers which brought around $1 
million per day. ISIS attacks on oil and gas pipelines are a big concern to Kurdistan 
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economy and also on transportation and production operation especially in disputed areas 
with many fields of gas and oil such as in Kirkuk and Mosul.  
In response to security concerns, many companies withdrew from Kurdistan such 
as ExxonMobil, the Irish oil and gas company Petro Celtic. A summer 2016 attack by 
ISIS on Kirkuk oil fields caused oil exportation to be halted for two days resulting in 
270,000 barrels per day of sales being lost, costing the KRG $19 million, assuming the 
price per barrel of oil at $35 (Zulal 2016). In the meantime, ISIS activities presented 
KRG a good opportunity to secure the return of all Kurdish lands taken by the regime of 
Saddam. Kurdistan security forces seized the territory in dispute area, such as Ain Zala, 
Khabbaz, which included many oil and gas fields, after the Iraqi army was defeated by 
ISIS in 2014 which expand ISIS area of control by 40 percent. However, much of this has 
changed since October 16, 2017. Since October 2017 Iraqi government forces and Shia 
military groups have taken control of these oil and gas rich areas. 
Shiite groups became involved in the campaign against ISIS. The problem is that 
these groups are not controlled by the government and they have their own agendas. Most 
of the groups have loyalty to Iran, which is considered an enemy to Kurdistan’s national 
interest. These groups consider KRG a hurdle to their goal of establishing a Shiite 
crescent encompassing Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. 
4.13 Kurdistan and Geographical Limitations 
Kurdistan, the land of roughly forty million Kurds, is the world’s largest nation 
without a state. Kurdistan is a landlocked region without a river or sea that has access to 
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an ocean. As considering the landlocked location of nature the KRI, it will encounter 
difficulties in getting its resources to the world market.  
Geopolitical theories have different views on the importance of location. One of 
the most important theories of geopolitics in the twentieth century was the focus of many 
geographers and politicians on Mackinder’s heartland theory, in which Kurdistan is 
located in the area known as the inner crescent. Based on analysis the theory predicts the 
importance of Kurdistan’s location. Because of its location, Kurdistan was likely to be 
divided by the powers of the Heartland and Rimland. Kurdistan, falls within both the 
Heartland and the coastal fringes of Eurasia, what Mackinder called the Inner Crescent 
and Spykman later called the Rimland (Efferink 2015). The geostrategic position of 
region plays a large role alongside other aspects like quality of government, cultural and 
demographic characteristics. The geographical location of landlocked countries creates 
many obstacles in foreign trade and presents challenges to the formation of foreign policy 
toward neighboring countries. Lack of ocean access and energy resources are also highly 
relevant, as (Idan and Shaffer 2011) noted. The location of Kurdistan makes the KRG 
less independent in term of economic or the strategic decisions. Kurdistan being 
landlocked creates many obstacles, and it is made worse by difficult relationships with 
neighbors.  
Kurdistan’s relations with Iran, Iraq and Turkey have remained complex. Iran 
supports the anti-Turkey Workers Party and Iran also supports the Shiite militia against 
Kurds, and for these reasons Kurdistan wants independence. After the referendum held in 
Kurdistan on the question of self-determination, Iran and Turkey took steps against 
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Kurdistan such as closing the border between Kurdistan and them, which hurt Kurdistan 
and made the situation worse. Landlocked states have much less flexibility in terms of 
policy, which in turn affects their foreign policy decisions. But with the development of 
the world and technology, there have been changes in the definition of geopolitics. 
Political factors can have a greater negative influence than being landlocked, such as 
hostile neighbors, rough terrain, and colonial heritage (Sievers and Urbatsch 2018). The 
characteristic of Kurdistan’s land is another obstacle worse than being landlocked. 
Mountains cover half of Kurdish homeland, making the Kurdish community is more 
separate, not integrated. Geographic location is only one factor. All other factors must be 
taken in consider such as how available resources are, the cost, the size and location of 
energy, alternative transportation routes to market, balance and political decision, and 
regulation of market are all important too. Also, the more external factors have impact on 
the policy of the countries with not outlet access to water body, which are certainly 
important because markets, transit routes, infrastructure, security and financing have to 
be taken into account. 
 Many politicians propose to the Government of Kurdistan to strengthen its 
relationship and cooperation with major countries such as America, the European Union, 
and Turkey to overcome the obstacle of being landlocked and remain a political force. 
The KRG is among Turkey’s best ten economic allies. The two share a 350 km border, 
which remains Turkey’s only crossing border point to Iraq (Heshmati, Dilani, and Baban 
2014). The Kurdistan government, especially the Democratic Party, maintains good 
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relations with Turkey, as well as the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan with Iran, which will 
serve as a safety valve for the security and stability of Kurdistan.  
Although Turkey is considered a stanch opponent of an independent KRG, 
“Turkey could find great economic gain should they cooperate with the Kurds and 
provide an avenue for oil to the European Union and the U.S (Lewis 2008, 65). Along 
these lines, KRG has attempted to build relationships with countries that have sympathies 
toward Kurdistan, such as Israel. The right of Israel to exist is well recognized by the 
KRG. Masoud Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Region, in a 2005 interview with the 
Saudi daily Al- Hyat said, “Iraqi Kurdistan has no objection to establishing diplomatic 
relations with Israel, establishing relations between the Kurds and Israel is not a crime” 
(Khalidi 2017). Diversification of natural gas exports, which would lead to a breakout 
from the current regional infrastructural-geographical constraints. In the future, Kurdistan 
may hold a referendum and gain independence but they will still remain influenced by 
powerful neighbors like Turkey and Iran. It will also be influence by its location. On the 
other hand, since 2007 Kurdistan governments have been accused of utilizing oil and 
natural gas resources in order to strengthen the region’s independence and to stabilize its 
internal political and economic order, while at the same time opposition parties have 
suggested that widespread corruption leads to high level officials in the ruling PDK and 
PUK to profit personally from oil and gas sales, since Barzani and Talabani rose to power 
in 1991. In the end, the presence of powerful business investment in Kurdistan will 
provide KRG with a safety that weapons cannot. Also, Kurdistan may have one outlet to 
the ocean through west Kurdistan in the future, if the Syrian crisis ends (See Figure 19). 
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Figure 19. Kurdistan’s Potential Gas and Oil Pipeline to Syria. Source: Author. 
 
 
4.14 The Future of Kurdistan’s Gas Industry 
4.14.1 Domestic Demand and Local Issues' Scenario: 
The current gas production of KRG stands at nearly 3-4 (bcm) billion cubic 
meters per year. Most of Kurdistan’s electricity power stations are run by gas with the 
exception of Duhok power stations, which are powered by diesel. Diesel stations cost 
KRG $100 million per month and are more expensive to run than gas powered plants 
(Mills 2018). Since KRG has solved its lawsuit with Dana Gas (Zhdannikov 2017a), they 
have planned to further develop the KorMor and Chamchamal gas fields. KRG also plans 
to drill eight new gas fields.  
129 
 
According to the managing director of Dana Gas, gas production in Kurdistan will 
be raised from the current 330 million cubic meters to 800 million per day. This would be 
about 8 bcm per year. The increase in production will be completed within two years 
(Zhdannikov 2017a). The production could rise to 5-10 bcm per day if energy companies 
add production to existing gas fields productions, such as Chamachaml, Kurmala, 
Kurdmir and Topkhana. But all of this is based on of KRG’s economic capabilities and 
political development.  
The domestic demand in Kurdistan 5.7 tcm per year, which is not very high. 
However, KRG’s domestic gas requirements are on the increase due to economic 
activities and population growth. There is also some demand for domestic gas to generate 
electricity to run some small factories. If the plans to further develop fields like Khurmala 
proceed smoothly, this would mean around 750 million additional cubic feet per day for 
domestic power generation in early 2020 (Mess 2017). That would solve the electric 
shortages in Kurdistan. Currently, the Kurdistan Region experiences on average between 
18 to 20 hours of electricity daily (Rudaw 2016). Additional production could come from 
Genel Energy Company, a Turkish gas company, who is another investor in the 
Kurdistan gas fields. Genel tried to find a partner to invest $2.5 billion in the Miran and 
Bina Bawi gas fields (Roberts 2016). These two fields could produce nearly 7-10 bcm 
annually. Genel Energy has revenue sharing contracts and gas lifting agreements for the 
Miran and Bina Bawi fields’ development, which have yet to begin production. Genel 
Energy could export an initial 4bcm/year to Turkey and this looks likely to happen by 
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2020 (Rzayeva 2018). That would add more than 4 billion cubic meters annually (Mills 
2018a).  
Since KRG's gas are mostly non-associated, they can be developed more than 
other Iraqi gas, which is mostly associated gas. Associated gas costs more to be ready for 
export (Al-Khatteeb 2013). Most of the KRG's gas resources are in Sulaymaniyah, 
Garmian, such as Topkhana, Kurdamir and KhorMor gas fields, which are located near 
the boundary line between Kurdistan region and the rest of Iraq which is controlled by 
the Iraqi Federal Government in Baghdad. Sulaymaniyah and Garmian, which is 
controlled by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has better relations with Baghdad 
and Tehran than the Kurdistan Democratic Party (PDK). Relations with Tehran are 
important because they could shift the political balance in the KRG. Tehran strongly 
supports the PUK and Gorran. Tehran could also increase influence by expanding its 
military presence in regions controlled by the PUK (Tanchum 2015). Iraq needs to secure 
at least 1bcf- 8 bcf of gas per day for future local demand (Al-Khatteeb 2013). The gas 
from south fields in Kurdistan could be exported to provinces under the Iraqi Federal 
Government to run electricity power stations. The Federal Government has already 
signed a contract to buy gas from Iran to fill shortages in electricity supply. However, 
Iraq is facing security issues in some areas along with high prices of Iranian gas. Iran has 
exported 1.2 bcm of gas from the Naft Mahr Karmashan station to Iraq since late June 
2017.  
Location favors Kurdistan as a gas export because of its distance to multiple 
markets. Kurdistan’s Topkhana and Kurdamir gas fields are less than 150 km from Iran. 
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At the same time other gas fields are relatively far from the Turkish border, two such gas 
fields are Miran and Bani Bawi. These field are 300-400 km from the Turkish border but 
are owned by Genel.  
4.14.2 Foreign Demand and External Issues' Scenario: 
Turkey needs Kurdish gas, but they know Kurdistan’s gas is surrounded by many 
risks, especially after Kurds in Iraq voted in support of independence in 2017, even 
though KhorMor could supply Turkey with 2.6 bcm/y and its gas is sweeter (Mess 2017). 
The Turkish Genel Company had an agreement signed with KRG to export gas to Turkey 
from Miran and Bina Bawi since 2013. But, according to The Turkish Ministry of Energy 
and Natural Resources’, the official strategy for “electricity and the security of supply” 
deals with this by seeking to reduce the share of natural gas to electricity generation by 
2023 to 30%, falling from the current 46%. The success of these projects would thin the 
role of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) as a regional economic actor ( 
Okumuş 2017), but Turkey still may need gas from Kurdistan due to it is cheap cost. 
Turkey will not pay more than $260 per 1,000 cubic meters and it is easy to import gas 
from Kurdistan due to the closest station not exceeding 500 km. For example, if Turkey 
used 10-12 bcm of Kurdistan’s gas, the additional gas of Kurdistan could export to 
Europe markets via TANAP. However, there are still more obstacles facing Kurdistan gas 
development, such as poor gas infrastructure.  
Furthermore, there are external issues hampering the Kurdistan gas industry.  
Developing a plan for the gas industry is more complicated because of interference from 
Russia in Kurdistan policy. The Russian company Rosneft, signed agreements with KRG 
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and paid $1 to invest in Kurdistan gas. Both Russian companies, Gazprom and Rosneft, 
may act as rivals. Rosneft could help or prevent development of Kurdish gas industry. To 
limit Kurdistan gas Rosneft could try to limits Kurdish gas as a potential competitor to 
Russian gas in Turkish and southeast European markets. Rosneft could also strengthen 
Kurdistan’s gas industry by biting into the Turkish gas market. If KRG works with the 
Russian firm, production of gas may reach 29 bcm, with 5.7 bcm used domestically and 
an initial export by Rosneft of nearby 20 bcm to Turkey. This rise to 29 bcm would 
happen in the long term (Mills 2018b). On the other hand, one possibility is Russia will 
control the Kurdistan gas and oil pipeline, which could lead to weakening Europe’s and 
Turkey’s pivotal role in the Kurdistan energy sector (Ala’Aldeen et al. 2018). 
Other opportunities for KRG would be through Syria in the future, although it’s 
less likely as the route to carry Kurdistan’s gas to the Mediterranean Sea. Turkey does not 
want Kurdistan energy to reach the Mediterranean Sea to keep the Kurds from sending 
their oil and gas to Europe’s market without Turkish role. This could be one reason why 
the Turkish army launched a huge offensive in March 2017 to occupy Afrin City in 
northern Aleppo. The offensive cut the outlet of the Kurds to the sea. There would be 
another KRG corridor from the Anbar Province through Jordan. Finally, the future 
political outlook of Kurdistan is still difficult, as both internal and external obstacles 
create a disturbing picture that seems to change with each new day.
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the comprehensive results for understanding the topic of 
this dissertation. This study reviewed the energy policy of the KRG with special attention 
given to the geopolitical problems of Kurdish natural gas policy. It is hoped this research 
might assist policy makers in Kurdistan, energy companies interested in the natural gas 
sector in Kurdistan, and its neighbors.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to discuss the greatest geopolitical challenges 
facing Kurdistan in fashioning energy policy with respect to its gas sector. Two questions 
have been asked. First, has KRG gas policy succeeded in developing Kurdistan’s 
economy? Second, what are the external challenges facing KRG gas policy? The case 
study been applied to achieve this goal and to better understand the most geopolitical 
challenges faced KRG gas policy.  
The study has utilized two sources of data. The first source includes interviews 
with parliament’s member of Iraq and Kurdistan region, energy companies operating in 
Kurdistan and also scholars that working in energy and geopolitical field. The second 
source of data is comprised of articles, government documents and media. The data were 
analyzed using MAXQDA to categories interviews and coded data. This study has 
discussed in detail the geopolitical challenges natural gas by applying a qualitative
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analysis, and single case study (interview analysis). The research examines the internal 
and external challenges facing KRG gas policy.
Analysis of the data suggests that the challenges are both internal and external to 
Kurdistan. Furthermore, both internal and external challenges are multifaceted which has 
clouded understanding by Parliament members in both Iraq and Kurdistan region, foreign 
oil companies, and the media.  
The major internal geopolitical challenges facing Kurdistan include:   
 Disputes between Erbil and Baghdad over revenues from gas sales and the 
question of sovereignty; 
 Kurdistan’s landlocked geography making export routes challenging and 
dependent upon transit states; 
 Disputes between the two ruling political parties on how deal with gas 
policy because PUK is Iranian ally and PDK as closer to Turkey; 
 The security situation in the region, such the risk of Islamic State attacks; 
 The challenging role of the PKK in negotiating with Turkey as a transit 
state for gas exports. 
Another reason production of natural gas in Kurdistan has not developed reliably 
stems from problems between the KRG and Dana Gas. The dispute between KRG and 
Dana Gas in the London Court of Arbitration resulted in a $26 million dollar payout from 
KRG to Dana Gas. Payment was compensation for suspended work in the KorMor gas 
field.  
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Other challenges facing Kurdistan include the quantity of gas production, which is 
still at the same level since the start of gas production as a result of several factors. Most 
notable of these challenges is combination of financial crisis and security concerns, but 
also the influx of some 2 million refugees to the Kurdistan region. The combination of 
financial and security problems mentioned above has had a significantly negative impact 
on the production of natural gas in Kurdistan.  
In addition, the transportation and storage infrastructure is poor in Kurdistan. 
Kurdistan has only 176 km of pipeline to transport gas from the KorMor field, 
Kurdistan’s only producing field, to power plants in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. The 
KorMor field has a production capacity of 8.5 mcm /d. This amount of gas can only 
support a small proportion of a particular region’s electrical needs. Further, energy 
demand will only increase with the growing population of the province. The province’s 
population in recent years has grown as a result of the improvement in economic 
situation. The gas infrastructure in Kurdistan needs to be developed but KRG lacks the 
resources to develop it on its own. The development of the infrastructure needs billions of 
dollars just to expand the construction of a pipeline from the Miran gas field to the 
Turkish border needs $100 million according interview with (Saad 2016) the junior 
adviser to KRG.   
Another major issue facing the Kurdistan region government is its lack a full 
sovereignty. KRG has local sovereignty and some regional sovereignty. Evidence of the 
region’s increasing sovereignty is demonstrated by multiple superpowers opening 
consulates in Erbil. However, this does not mean the government has all of the privileges 
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that sovereignty confers. For example, the KGR is unable to request loans from countries 
or NGO’s like The World Bank. In recent years KRG has developed a poor reputation 
associated with non-payment of wages to energy companies operating in the region. In 
addition to a security problem faced energy companies that were push some of them 
withdrawal in upstream and downstream in Kurdistan, such as the giant company 
ExxonMobil in the fields of Basheqa, Qarahanjeer, and Betwata. Other issues facing the 
natural gas industry are the most natural gas in Kurdistan in terms of quality is not sweet 
gas except KorMor field but two gain natural gas field  Miran Bina Bawi contains 
impurities and toxic gases at a very high rate compared to the rest of the quality of gas in 
Iraq in Basra and Anbar. 
The main external geopolitical challenges facing Kurdistan included: Kurdistan's 
policies toward neighbors like Iran and Turkey as well as the growing role of Russia in 
influencing gas exports in the region.  
In the short term Erbil’s energy policy is currently attractive to foreign 
companies. The presence of important global actors like Russia and the United States 
suggests there is clear development of bilateral energy relations. But still there is a great 
desire for the government of Kurdistan after filling local needs for generating electricity. 
But the inability of the central government and the KRG to agree concerning disputed 
areas, type of contracts signed with companies, and sharing of revenues, prevents the 
government from building gas infrastructure.  
Despite that the fact that there is a signed contract in 2013 between Genel Energy 
Turkish Company and Ministry of Resources in Kurdistan for 50 years to export 10 
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million cubic meters by 2017 as the first stage. An agreement with the Russian company 
Rosneft contracts for the export 20 billion meters of by the end of 2020, the issue with 
Rosneft is that KRG took an advance of $1 billion (Bierman and Sergie 2017) to be 
repaid not with cash but rather in the form of cheap gas.   
Another challenge facing the gas industry in Kurdistan is its location as a 
landlocked country surrounded by countries that have historically been hostile to the 
independence wishes of the Kurds. Countries such as Turkey and Iran have different 
agendas in the region and therefore have affected Kurdistan in varying ways. Currently,  
the only viable way for Kurdistan to export gas to Europe is through Turkey. An end to 
the Syrian civil war and the opening of a pathway to the Mediterranean Sea could create 
possibilities to export from the Kurdistan Region to Europe through Kurdish controlled 
areas in Syria but this prospect is still highly uncertain (“Iraqi Kurdistan Could Export 
Gas to EU by 2019: Envoy” 2016). Since the AKP came to power in Turkey, there has 
been an improvement in economic cooperation and also somewhat political relationship 
with the KRG. This combined with the strained relations between Turkey and Russia in 
the wake of the downing of a Russian warplane by Turkish forces in 2016, could create 
opportunities for further developing relations between KRG and Turkey to counter a high 
reliance of Turkey on Russia for gas. 
A further intractable problem is the presence of irregular armed groups in 
disputed areas west of Kirkuk, where some of the most important gas fields are located. 
In 16 October 2017 Iraqi forces and the PUF army attacked Kirkuk and Mosul and re-
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gained control of the disputes areas. They also re-gained control over Mosul, where the 
Ain Zala and Batma oil fields are located. 
In addition, the presence of guerrilla groups against the Turkish and Iranian 
government, including the PKK and Pjak, may threaten gas exporting to markets. These 
groups threaten gas exporting facilities. For example, the military commander of PKK 
announced the day after signed an agreement in 2013 between Erbil and Ankara to export 
Kurdistan’s gas to Turkey that they planned to target this pipeline because the contract 
allegedly benefitted Erdogan, the PKK’s main enemy.  
On the other hand, the popular Shiite armed groups threatened KRG that they will 
not accept oil and gas resources from disputed areas because these fields should be 
controlled by central government. The referendum in the September of 2017 provided 
Shitte groups with pretext to regain control of the disputed areas that were under KRG 
control. Control of disputed areas by these groups means controlling more gas and oil 
wells and weakening the Kurdish government. 
But in spite of all these obstacles, the KRG is continuing to sign more gas and oil 
agreements with companies. The last of these promising agreements to develop, extract, 
and export hydrocarbon resources was with Rosneft and spans 20 years. With this 
agreement Russia is trying to influence the energy policy of KRG because Russia does 
not want that the emergence of a strong exporter that competes with Russian gas in 
Turkey and European markets. According to Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak 
talked to Kurdistan 24 tv: we will establish two gas pipelines from Kurdistan to Black sea 
through Turkey with capacity of each will be 15,70 bcm in 2020 (Ali 2017). 
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Furthermore, Kurdistan has had to deal with internal problems, such as conflict 
between PUK and PDK authority and controlling more resources, and political conflicts 
between opposing parties that rules region. This is in addition to various external 
pressures from Turkey and Iran and occasional political tensions with the central 
government in Baghdad after referendums held in September 25, 2017.   
Since the energy of Kurdistan's policy is very much interconnected with 
geopolitical developments due to its dependence on export its natural gas on neighbor’s 
roads. It is best for KRG to improve relations with Baghdad from all aspects of political 
and economic first. To improve the gas industry and export through Baghdad and solve 
all problems related to the types of contracts and the distribution of revenues of gas and 
oil. It is also important to improve the internal political situation and to reconcile with all 
parties including the opposition in order to promote and develop energy policy through 
apply the law release from Kurdistan parliament related to the energy sector. Second, it is 
also necessary to improve its commercial and political relations with neighboring 
countries, also with Russia, America and the Europe united because without improved 
relations with neighboring countries cannot overcome its geographical location closed.  
Nevertheless, the internal political variability between Kurd, Arab Sunni, and 
Arab Shia, and the activities of PUF in Iraq have the likely to risk the stability of KRG 
and the Iraq which may affect the future gas export opportunities to international market. 
KRG should redouble efforts to reduce the geopolitical risks affecting energy. The 
linkage of the natural gas networks of Kurdistan Iraq, Iran and Turkey, would provide 
useful export paths for natural resources but also serve to improve political relationships.  
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The broader geopolitical importance of Kurdistan gas remains unexplored. This 
dissertation specifically provides an in depth look into the complexities arising from both 
Iraq’s internal politics and powerful external actors seeking to interfere with the future of 
its gas sector for geopolitical purposes. Also, this research makes empirical contributions 
to the literature on the geopolitical challenges in general, and on the Kurdistan region’s 
gas sector challenges in specific. The findings of the research are significant, given that 
few previous studies on the broader geopolitical literature have examined the Kurdistan 
energy sector. The implications of this research may be useful in helping new KRG’s gas 
policy to avoid the challenges. 
5.2 Recommendations for Kurdistan Gas Sector 
Based on the findings of my dissertation research, I propose the following policy 
recommendations to help develop the gas sector in Kurdistan: 
1. The conflicts surrounding gas and oil need solutions firmly positioned on 
solid legal and political grounds. Relevant provisions of the Iraqi 
constitution should be fully implemented expeditiously. That would lead 
the KRG and Iraqi central government to work together to develop the 
energy sector, such as by setting up an Energy Council of gas and oil.  
2. Building up a petrochemical industry would create new job opportunities 
for people. Other domestic needs could be addressed by utilizing gas to 
generate electricity to meet local demand, while exporting surplus gas to 
other provinces under Bagdad’s authority.  
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3. Fields close in proximity to Iraq, such as Kurdmir and Topkhana, should 
be utilized to supply Iraq rather than importing expensive gas from Iran.  
4. A national Kurdish Energy Company for upstream and downstream 
processing and for marketing, such as the Iraqi Oil Marketing Company 
(SOMO), should be established.  
5. Creating new and expanding existing gas infrastructure, such as LNG gas 
storage and terminal for growing LNG market expectation in the world 
markets, should be a high priority.  
6. A specific fund to hold money from gas and oil sale to develop non – oil 
and gas sectors should be set up.   
 In addition to the above concrete proposals, the KRG needs to devise a plan B in 
order to export gas in the future from the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea through Syria 
or Jordan, which would make KRG more independent. A successful plan B requires KRG 
to have friendly relations with Baghdad. A good relationship would be built on allowing 
Kurdistan to export gas and oil to Asia markets through the Arab Gulf, and KRG 
allowing resource exports from the rest of Iraq to Turkey. One example of a cooperative 
partnership would be a joint effort to export gas using Iraq’s central State Organization 
for Marketing of Oil (SOMO), which the KRG is currently independent of. 
 This depends less on foreign companies than it does on cooperation with 
Baghdad. For example, Rosneft's energy projects in Kurdistan may not be motivated 
solely by economic gains but rather they also may be aimed at strengthening Russia's 
strategic position in the Middle East through energy relations. KRG should not use gas as 
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political items rather than economic. In the past ten years that KRG experiences in the oil 
and gas sector were not successful, the failure of its policy got KRG into too many 
economic problems with Baghdad. 
 Transparency here is vital. The revenue generated from the formal sale of KRG’s 
oil and gas should be disclosed to the parliament of Kurdistan. An effective role of 
parliament to increase transparency in revenue collection and spending, and encouraging 
political and social cohesion in the Kurdistan region would be to establish an independent 
auditor’s office. It will build trust between the government and the public. If KRG has a 
policy in a gas sector, then the gas sector would be more important than the oil, due to the 
appraisal of the oil reserve being lower than what international companies expected. 
Finally, KRG follows the best market for selling gas. KRG should not mix national-
political interests with economic interests, and they should cooperate with all willing 
parties to develop the gas. 
5.3 Limitations of the Dissertation 
The methodologies used here had two major limitations: First, limited data is 
available, especially the lack of data published by Ministry of natural resources regularly 
on secret agreements signed with international companies. A second limitation stems 
from a lack of transparency. The lack of transparency includes the KRG not disclosing all 
details about oil and gas revenues. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
KRG Kurdistan Regional Government 
ISIS The Islamic State Of Iraq And Al-Sham 
PUK Patriotic Union Of Kurdistan 
PDK Kurdistan Democratic Party 
PKK Kurdistan Workers' Party 
GORRAN Gorran Movement 
BCM Billion Cubic Meters Of Natural Gas 
PJAK Kurdistan Free Life Party 
ROJAVA Democratic Federation Of Northern Syria 
MMSCFD Million Standard Cubic Feet Per Day 
BOPD Barrels Of Oil Per Day 
TANAP Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline 
TCF Trillion Cubic Feet 
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APPENDIX B 
 
MAIN GAS FIELDS IN KURDISTAN REGION CURRENTLY  
 
 
# Blocks                            Companies                    Location          Status                             
1 Chemchemal Pearl Petroleum Sulaimanya Open 
2 KhorMor Pearl Petroleum Sulaimanya Production 
3 Miran Genel Energy Sulaimanya Production 
4 Bina Bawi Genel Energy Erbil Operation 
5 Kurdamir Repsol Sulaimanya Exploration 
6 Sumail DNO ASA Duhok Production 
7 Khurmala KAR Group Erbil Production 
8 Topkhana Talisman Sulaimanya Exploration 
9 Akri-Bijeel MOL Duhok Operation 
10 Chia Surkh Genel Energy Sulaimanya Operation 
 
